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What a Difference a Day Makes, or Does It?
Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week
MICHELLE A. TRAVIS
This Article considers the growing reliance that four-day work week
advocates have placed on work/family claims. It begins by analyzing
whether a compressed work schedule may alleviate work/family conflicts,
and more importantly, for whom such benefits are most likely to accrue.
While studies consistently find that many workers experience lower levels
of work/family conflict when working a compressed schedule, the research
also suggests that workers with the most acute work/family conflicts may
be the least likely either to obtain or to benefit from a four-day work week
design. Nevertheless, the political climate surrounding the four-day work
week provides a unique opportunity for action. This Article therefore
considers how legal regulation might be used to shape four-day work week
initiatives as a work/family balance tool. In particular, the Article
considers how reflexive law proposals might contribute to the four-day
work week debate. While existing reflexive law models typically rely on
the creation and exercise of procedural rights vested in individual workers,
this Article explores an under-developed alternative that would instead
vest procedural rights primarily in workers as a group. The Article uses
California’s extensive four-day work week regulations and the Federal
Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act to illustrate this
“collective reflexive” approach, and to explore what this type of
regulatory model might offer advocates who are seeking to facilitate
greater work/family balance for those who may need it the most.
1223

ARTICLE CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 1225
II. THE FOUR-DAY WORK WEEK AND WORK/FAMILY
BALANCE: MOVING FROM “WHETHER OR NOT?”
TO
“FOR WHOM?” ................................................................................... 1228
A. WHETHER OR NOT? ........................................................................... 1228
B. FOR WHOM? ...................................................................................... 1232
III. A COLLECTIVE REFLEXIVE APPROACH
TO REGULATING THE FOUR-DAY WORK WEEK ..................... 1242
A. THE CALIFORNIA WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY ACT ............................. 1254
B. THE FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES ACT ...................... 1262
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 1265

What a Difference a Day Makes, or Does It?
Work/Family Balance and the Four-Day Work Week
MICHELLE A. TRAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the themes that proponents of the four-day work week have
been increasingly relying upon is the potential benefit that a compressed
work schedule may provide for workers who are balancing paid work with
family care. This work/family theme, however, frequently shows up as an
afterthought rather than as a driving force in shaping the development of
four-day work week policies. For example, the Federal Employees
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act,1 which encourages federal
agencies to offer their employees compressed work schedules, was initially
pitched in the 1970s as a traffic congestion measure.2 Two decades later,
the Clinton administration began touting the Act as a model program for
building a family-friendly workplace, even though no meaningful
work/family research had informed the Act’s enactment or design.3 This
Article considers the growing reliance that four-day work week advocates
have placed on work/family claims. Specifically, it analyzes both the
extent to which a compressed work schedule may alleviate work/family
conflicts, and more importantly, for whom such benefits are most likely to
accrue. The goal of this analysis is to help better inform and position
work/family advocates to more effectively steer the four-day work week
debate.
Part II begins by reviewing the existing social science literature on the
work/family impact of compressed work schedules. Most of this research
has focused on the threshold inquiry of whether or not a four-day work
week can alleviate work/family conflict for those workers who gain access
to a compressed work schedule. As Part II.A explains, this research
*
Professor, University of San Francisco School of Law. I would like to thank Rachel ArnowRichman and Vicki Schultz for important insights that shaped my thinking on this project, Jessica
Simmons for her research assistance, and Richard Dickson for his support.
1
5 U.S.C. §§ 6120–6133 (2006). This law also is referred to as the Alternative Work Schedules
Act (“AWSA”). Janet M. Liechty & Elaine A. Anderson, Flexible Workplace Policies: Lessons from
the Federal Alternative Work Schedules Act, 56 FAM. REL. 304, 305 (2007). For a description of the
legislative history of the AWSA, see infra notes 38–45 and accompanying text.
2
See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307.
3
See id. at 307–10 (explaining how the AWSA, which “was first meant to deal with Washington,
DC traffic congestion in 1978,” ultimately became “a centerpiece of federal family-friendly policies by
1997,” without any meaningful consideration of work/family research).
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appears quite positive on its face by consistently finding that many
workers’ self-reported levels of work/family conflict are lower when
working a compressed schedule than for workers laboring under a more
traditional five-day work week.4 While certainly promising, these research
results provide an insufficient basis, on their own, either for asserting
generally that the four-day work week enhances work/family balance, or
for prioritizing four-day work week initiatives over other work/family
policies. Such conclusions demand an additional level of research that
moves beyond just identifying a link between the four-day work week and
reduced work/family conflict, to also considering which workers will likely
experience such positive results.
Undifferentiated claims about the work/family benefits of a four-day
work week often are premised on an assumption of a homogeneous
workforce facing homogeneous work/family conflicts. Part II.B challenges
that assumption, not only by considering the types of workers who are least
likely to experience work/family benefits from a four-day schedule, but
also by identifying the large population of workers who are unlikely to
gain access to a four-day work week altogether. The research suggests that
workers with the most acute work/family conflicts often will be among
those least likely either to obtain or to benefit from a four-day work week.
This is in part the result of the growing bifurcation of the workforce into
very long-hour, full-time positions and very short-hour, part-time jobs.5
Since 1970, the forty-hour work week—which often is associated with
relatively low initial levels of work/family conflict and which is most
easily transitioned into a four-day schedule—has become increasingly less
typical.6 In contrast, the growing workforce laboring in jobs at both ends
of the emerging “time divide”—i.e., jobs that are least likely to be
redesigned into a four-day work week—often experience the highest levels
of work/family conflict, from very different sources, which will require
very different solutions to address.7 Part II.B also questions the ability of
the four-day work week to meaningfully alter the existing gendered
division of labor that contributes to the severe work/family conflicts
experienced by many women who are combining paid work with
disproportionate family care.
Although the conclusions in Part II thus raise doubts about whether a
four-day work week should find its way to the top of a work/family
advocate’s policy agenda, Part III recognizes that the current business,
media, and political attention being paid to the four-day work week
4

See infra notes 12–36 and accompanying text.
See JERRY A. JACOBS & KATHLEEN GERSON, THE TIME DIVIDE: WORK, FAMILY, AND GENDER
INEQUALITY 5, 36, 60 (2004); see also infra notes 66–79 and accompanying text.
6
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 32–33, 33 fig.1.4; see also infra notes 66–68 and
accompanying text.
7
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 5; see also infra notes 69–79 and accompanying text.
5
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provides a unique opportunity for action. Part III therefore considers how
legal regulation of the four-day work week might shape this particular
form of workplace flexibility most effectively as a work/family initiative.
To that end, Part III begins by considering the three major approaches
that have dominated work/family discourse about workplace flexibility
more generally. On one end of the spectrum are top-down “command-andcontrol” approaches that rely on prescriptive rules and sanctions for noncompliance.8 On the other end of the spectrum are forms of market-based
governance, which focus not on legal intervention but on making the
business case for flexibility to maximize voluntary and efficient
experimentation with working time innovation.9 In the middle of these two
extremes lies the burgeoning “new governance” literature, which
emphasizes public oversight of private, regulatory initiatives, including
various forms of “reflexive law,” which focus on procedural rather than
substantive obligations to facilitate information exchange and selfregulation.10 The new governance scholars have made a compelling case
that this middle-ground approach may provide a viable solution both to
regulatory and market failures by recognizing that “economic efficiency
and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.”11
While the reflexive law proposals within the new governance approach
have much to offer work/family advocates who are considering effective
regulation of the four-day work week, these proposals typically rely on the
creation and exercise of individual worker rights. Part III uses California’s
extensive four-day work week regulations and the Federal Employees
Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act as two examples of a
different reflexive approach—one that vests procedural rights primarily in
workers as a group, rather than as individuals. Part III explores this
“collective reflexive” approach as one additional regulatory method for
work/family advocates to consider when entering the four-day work week
debate. While Part III ultimately concludes that California’s approach, in
particular, may be too complicated to be truly effective, these examples
nevertheless illustrate an important and under-developed regulatory model
for expanding workplace flexibility to facilitate greater work/family
balance for those who may need it the most.

8

See infra notes 100–10 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 111–22 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
11
See Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004); see also infra note 125 and
accompanying text.
9
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II. THE FOUR-DAY WORK WEEK AND WORK/FAMILY BALANCE:
MOVING FROM “WHETHER OR NOT?” TO “FOR WHOM?”
This section reviews the existing social science research on the
work/family impact of compressed work schedules. It begins by asking
whether or not any link has been established between a four-day work
week and reduced work/family conflict. While the research answers this
question in the affirmative, this section goes on to explore, more
specifically, for whom such benefits are most likely to accrue. Because the
research suggests that workers with the most acute work/family conflicts
often may be among those least likely either to obtain or to benefit from a
four-day work week, this section raises doubts as to whether work/family
advocates should—if writing on a clean slate—prioritize four-day work
week initiatives over other work/family policy measures.
A. Whether or Not?
Although four-day work week advocates rarely cite research to support
their sweeping assertions of work/family benefits, the totality of the
research indeed has established that such a link exists in certain
circumstances. These studies typically rely on worker surveys that provide
self-reports of work/family conflict levels. They attempt to establish a
causal connection between compressed work schedules and reduced
work/family conflict by comparing the responses of workers on a
compressed schedule to workers on a more traditional schedule, or by
asking workers to make a before-and-after comparison of their own
experience after moving from a traditional to a compressed work week. As
a whole, this body of research provides a fairly optimistic assessment of
the potential for the four-day work week to serve as a work/family balance
tool.
One of the best examples of this type of research is a study conducted
by leading sociologists Rex L. Facer II and Lori Wadsworth.12 In this
study, Facer and Wadsworth analyzed whether a compressed work week
affected self-reported levels of work/family conflict in a group of city
government workers in a small but growing western community.13 In
2003, the city had shifted workers in some of its departments to a four-day,
ten-hour per day work week (also known as a “4/10”), which generally was

12
See generally Rex L. Facer II & Lori Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules and Work
Family Balance: A Research Note, 28 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 166 (2008), available at
http://rop.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/28/2/166 [hereinafter Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative
Work Schedules]. For updated commentary on this study, presented at this Symposium, see generally
Rex L. Facer II & Lori L. Wadsworth, Four-Day Work Weeks: Current Research and Practice, 42
CONN. L. REV. 1031 (2010).
13
Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules, supra note 12, at 166–68.
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scheduled from 7:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m., Monday through Thursday. To
obtain comparative results, Facer and Wadsworth surveyed both workers
who had switched to the compressed work week and workers who had
remained on a more traditional schedule of five working days per week.15
The surveys included six variables that assessed both work-to-family
conflict (i.e., the extent to which work impacts family life) and family-towork conflict (i.e., the extent to which family life impacts work).16 The
researchers asked respondents to assess each variable on a scale of one
(strongly disagree) to five (strongly agree).17 The work-to-family conflict
variables asked workers whether they came home from work too tired,
whether their work took away from their personal interests, and whether
their work took up time that they would rather spend with family or
friends.18 The family-to-work variables asked workers whether they found
themselves too tired at work because of activities at home, whether their
personal demands took away from their work, and whether their personal
lives took up time that they would rather spend at work.19 The researchers
also asked those working the four-day schedule to assess the extent to
which the compressed work week had made their childcare arrangements
more difficult.20
Overall, the results support the view that a four-day work week
facilitates work/family balance. Workers on the four-day work week
reported lower levels of work/family conflict than workers on more
traditional schedules on five of the six variables examined, with four of
those differences registering at a statistically significant level.21 When the
individual variables were combined into two overall scales—one for workto-family conflict and one for family-to-work conflict—the workers on the
four-day schedule reported lower levels of conflict at statistically
significant levels on both scales.22
In a multivariate analysis, Facer and Wadsworth demonstrated that the
lower levels of work-to-family conflict experienced by those on the fourday schedule existed even when holding other variables constant, including
job satisfaction levels, the number of dependants living in the worker’s
home, the worker’s age, and the worker’s length of employment with the

14

Id. at 168.
Id. at 168–69. The researchers received 132 usable surveys, and sixty percent of those
respondents were working the four-day, ten-hour-per-day schedule. Id. at 169–70.
16
Id. at 172, 172 tbl.4.
17
Id. at 172 tbl.4.
18
Id. at 172–73, 172 tbl.4.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 170–71, 171 tbl.2.
21
Id. at 172–73, 172 tbl.4. The two groups provided similar responses on the remaining variable:
feeling too tired at work because of home activities. Id. at 172 tbl.4, 173.
22
Id.
15
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city. The worker’s age, number of dependants at home, and length of
employment with the city also had no influence on the level of family-towork conflict, which was influenced most heavily by a worker’s rating on
the work-to-family conflict scale.24 Additionally, only 2.7% of the
respondents who had moved to the four-day work week agreed or strongly
agreed that childcare arrangements had become more difficult under the
Based on these results, Facer and
compressed work schedule.25
Wadsworth concluded that “employees working the 4/10 work-week
experience lower levels of work-family conflict than their counterparts
who are working other schedules in the city.”26
This study followed an earlier project that reported similar results in
the late 1990s.27 In that prior project, sociologist Michael J. Gilbert and
political scientist Arturo Vega studied how the move from a five-day per
week schedule to a three-day compressed work week affected self-reports
of work/family conflict among patrol officers at a Texas county sheriff’s
department.28 The researchers surveyed officers who had been assigned to
patrol for at least one year both before and after the compressed work week
was implemented and asked them to compare their experiences on the
traditional and the compressed work schedules.29 Over eighty-five percent
of these patrol officers reported that the compressed work week schedule
made it “‘easier’ or ‘much easier’ to devote time to family members,” and
over seventy-six percent reported finding it “easier to conduct family and
personal activities.”30
One of the earliest formal studies on the four-day work week found
strikingly similar results in 1970 using interviews and written surveys of
148 workers who had a four-day schedule at thirteen different firms
engaged in the manufacturing, service, and retail industries.31 In that
23

Id. at 173–74, 174 tbl.6.
Id. at 174–75, 175 tbl.7.
25
Id. at 170–71.
26
Id. at 175. See also Lori L. Wadsworth & Rex L. Facer II, Does the Four Day Work Week
Work?, FOX NEWS, July 7, 2009, http://foxnews.com/printer_friendly_story/0,3566,530392,00.html
(reporting on a follow-up study that surveyed 150 human resource directors, fifty-four percent of whom
reported improved work/family balance as an organizational benefit of alternative work schedules).
27
See generally Arturo Vega & Michael J. Gilbert, Longer Days, Shorter Weeks: Compressed
Work Weeks in Policing, 26 PUB. PERSONNEL MGMT. 391 (1997).
28
See id. at 391. In 1993, these workers moved from a traditional five-day work week to a threeday work week with each work day consisting of thirteen hours and twenty minutes of work. Id. at
391, 393. The research results were based on surveys of 103 officers who had been assigned to patrol
for both one year before and one year after the move from a traditional five-day, forty-hour work week
to the compressed three-day, forty-hour work week. Id. at 393.
29
Id. at 393.
30
Id. at 395.
31
James L. Steele & Riva Poor, Work and Leisure: The Reactions of People at 4-Day Firms, in 4
DAYS, 40 HOURS: REPORTING A REVOLUTION IN WORK AND LEISURE 105, 105–07, 111, 115 (Riva
Poor ed., 1970). The study also included twenty managers. Id. at 106. Of the 148 workers included in
the study, eighty-four were males and sixty-four were females. Id. Most of the workers were factory
personnel, with a smaller number of office, sales, and professional personnel as well. Id. at 106–07.
24
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study, seventy-five percent of the workers reported spending more time
with their families when working a four-day work week rather than a fiveday schedule.32 In response to an open-ended question asking the workers
to list advantages of the four-day work week, twenty-five cited the benefit
of increased family time.33
These findings are consistent with other studies on the work/family
effects of a compressed work week both within and outside the United
States.34 These include, among others, a recent meta-analysis of forty
studies from around the world that analyzed the effects of a compressed
work week on workers performing shift work, which the researchers
defined as any schedule that regularly includes work time outside of
standard business hours.35 The majority of these studies found
improvements in workers’ reported levels of work/family balance after the
compressed work week was introduced.36 As a whole, this body of
research is quite promising. By demonstrating that a causal link can exist
between compressed work schedules and improved work/family balance,
this research takes the important first step of validating consideration of
four-day work week initiatives within a work/family agenda.

The firms were primarily in the greater Boston area, although some were located in California, Florida,
and Oklahoma. Id. at 107. For reflections on the historical context of the four-day work week
presented at this Symposium, see generally Riva Poor, How and Why Flexible Work Weeks Came
About, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1047 (2010).
32
Steele & Poor, supra note 31, at 115.
33
Id. at 111 & tbl.3.
34
See, e.g., C. Bambra et al., “A Hard Day’s Night?” The Effects of Compressed Working Week
Interventions on the Health and Work-Life Balance of Shift Workers: A Systematic Review, 62 J.
EPIDEMIOLOGY COMM. HEALTH 764, 766, 768–73 (2008) (conducting a meta-analysis of forty studies
from around the world and concluding that the majority of studies found that a compressed work week
improved work/family balance for shift workers); E. Jeffrey Hill et al., Finding an Extra Day a Week:
The Positive Influence of Perceived Job Flexibility on Work and Family Life Balance, 50 FAM. REL.
49, 53–54 (2001) (summarizing the results of a large-scale survey of employees at IBM Corporation in
1996 that found that the availability of various flextime policies, including the compressed work week,
reduced the percentage of workers who reported work/family conflicts); Liechty & Anderson, supra
note 1, at 306 (noting that various government reports have documented work/family benefits for
federal employees who gained access to alternative work schedules, including compressed work weeks,
under the AWSA); Atefeh Sadri McCampbell, Benefits Achieved Through Alternative Work Schedules,
19 HUM. RES. PLAN. 30, 31–32 (1996) (studying federal agency workers and finding that
approximately fifty-four percent of those who were providing dependant care were using some type of
flexible work arrangement, including compressed work week schedules, and that doing so was “very
important to their decision to remain with their agency”); Simcha Ronen & Sophia B. Primps, The
Compressed Work Week as Organizational Change: Behavioral and Attitudinal Outcomes, 6 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 61, 64–67, 69 (1981) (summarizing studies done in the 1970s and finding that four of the
six studies measuring work/family balance reported that a compressed work week had “a positive effect
on home and personal life”).
35
Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 764–65.
36
Id. at 768.
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B. For Whom?
Feminist legal theorists have long challenged the assumption that all
forms of workplace flexibility are beneficial for all caregivers.37 As fourday work week advocates place increasing reliance on claims of
work/family benefits, there has become an increasing need to apply that
insight to this particular context. Specifically, research inquiries must
move beyond just proving that a causal link can exist between compressed
work schedules and reduced work/family conflict, to also identifying the
types of workers for whom such benefits are most and least likely to
accrue. This section provides a preliminary assessment of this secondary
inquiry by considering which workers are unlikely to experience improved
work/family balance while working a compressed schedule, which workers
are unlikely to obtain access to a four-day work week, and the likelihood
that a four-day work week will make inroads into the gendered division of
labor that contributes to work/family conflicts for many women. This
analysis provides a much less uniformly positive picture of the four-day
work week as a work/family balance tool.
One of the earliest analyses of these critical “for whom” questions was
performed during the federal legislative debates over whether to enact the
Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act—also
known as the Alternative Work Schedules Act (“AWSA”)38—on a
permanent basis in the early 1980s.39 The AWSA permits and creates
incentives for federal agencies to offer both compressed work schedules
and flextime, which allows employees to alter their daily start and stop
times within certain defined parameters.40 The federal government initially
enacted the AWSA in 1978 on a three-year experimental basis as a traffic
congestion measure and energy savings initiative in response to the energy
crisis of the late 1970s.41 Although one senator mentioned the potential
benefits that flextime might provide for workers seeking to balance work
with family obligations, personal business, or civic commitments, the
initial congressional hearings on the AWSA were neither driven nor

37

See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 310.
Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120–6133
(2006); see Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305 (describing the alternative and commonly-used
title for the Act, AWSA).
39
See HALCYONE H. BOHEN & ANAMARIA VIVEROS-LONG, BALANCING JOBS AND FAMILY LIFE
84, 107–09, 126–29 (1981); see also Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306–07 (describing the
Bohen and Viveros-Long research findings).
40
See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306. The AWSA incentivizes the use of compressed
work weeks by exempting federal agencies from existing daily overtime premiums if the agency
follows certain procedures to adopt the compressed work schedule. See infra notes 218–27 and
accompanying text.
41
Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307.
38
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informed by a work/family balance perspective. Congress re-authorized
the AWSA on another three-year experimental basis in 1982 after
additional hearings in which a work/family analysis was once again
conspicuously absent.43 Congress finally enacted the AWSA on a
permanent basis in 1985, and it was not until that third round of hearings
that work/family arguments were finally deployed—and then, largely as a
convenient afterthought.44
It was at the third hearing stage that supporters of the AWSA began
making general claims about the AWSA’s ability to solve work/family
conflicts, relying on a number of government studies of the AWSA during
its experimental periods that had provided positive—but undifferentiated—
evidence of the AWSA’s work/family benefits.45 It was in this context that
researchers Halcyone Bohen and Anamaria Viveros-Long performed the
first rigorous analysis of the work/family effects of the AWSA’s
experimental use.46 Bohen and Viveros-Long particularly were interested
in testing two core assumptions upon which the legislative testimony in
favor of the AWSA’s permanent status implicitly relied: the assumptions
that flextime uniformly facilitates work/family balance and that flextime
helps equalize the gendered division of domestic work.47 This research
project focused exclusively on federal agencies’ use of flextime under the
AWSA, rather than the use of a compressed work week,48 but its
discouraging conclusions in the former context provide a credible basis for
raising concerns about broad-reaching claims of work/family benefits from
a four-day work week as well.
In the Bohen and Viveros-Long study, the researchers surveyed 313
employees at a federal agency using a standard five-day work week and
393 employees at a federal agency that permitted flextime.49 Employees at
the flextime agency could exercise some control over their start and stop
times, but their work was still spread out over five days each week.50 At a
general level, the study’s results were consistent with the assertion that
flextime reduces work/family conflicts: the mean level of self-reported
work/family stress for the overall group of flextime employees was
significantly lower than the mean level of self-reported work/family stress
42

See id. at 307 (describing the remarks of Senator Jacob Javits, a Republican from New York, at
the Senate hearings).
43
See id. at 308–09 (observing that “the benefits of the AWSA for working mothers and
families . . . was curiously sidelined in the 1982 Senate hearings,” and that “[t]he dilemmas faced by
increasing numbers of mothers in the workforce were largely ignored in this round of hearings”).
44
See id. at 309.
45
See id. at 306, 309.
46
See id. at 306–07 (describing the Bohen and Viveros-Long research in the context of the
legislative history of the AWSA).
47
BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 126.
48
See id. at 84.
49
Id. at 108–09.
50
Id. at 84.
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for the overall group of employees on a standard five-day schedule.51 In
addition, both parents as a whole and women as a whole reported
significantly less work/family stress at the flextime agency than at the
agency with a traditional schedule.52
When the researchers differentiated the results further, however, the
picture became far less rosy. When focusing solely on mothers, whether
married or single, the study found that the ability of flextime to reduce
work/family stress “disappear[ed] altogether.”53 Flextime provided no
reduction in work/family stress for women who were trying to balance
participation in the paid labor market with primary childcare
responsibility.54 Fathers who had spouses employed outside the home
similarly reported no less work/family stress when working flextime versus
working a standard schedule.55 The only parents for whom flextime
reduced work/family conflict were fathers whose wives were not employed
outside the home.56 The primary groups of employees who reported
having less work/family stress on a flextime schedule than on a standard
schedule—and whose responses explained the overall finding of flextime’s
positive work/family effects—were employees who did not have primary
childcare responsibility, including single adults without children, married
women without children, and fathers whose wives were not engaged in
paid labor.57 What the undifferentiated positive survey results thus failed
to reveal was the fact that it was employees who began with the lowest
levels of work/family conflict who were ultimately helped the most.58
“[T]he simpler the family circumstances,” concluded the researchers, “the
more relative impact a little schedule flexibility seems to have.”59
This revealing study was largely ignored during the legislative debates
around the permanent enactment of the AWSA, which nevertheless relied
upon asserted work/family benefits as an additional reason for supporting
the AWSA on a long-term basis. Although the study focused on flextime
rather than a four-day work week, its findings highlight the importance of
looking beyond generalized survey results that find work/family benefits
for groups of workers as a whole.
In the two most prominent studies of compressed work weeks
described above, the published data does not differentiate among workers
51

Id. at 127.
Id.
53
Id. at 127–29.
54
See id. at 129.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 128–29.
57
Id. at 129. See also Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306–07 (describing the Bohen and
Viveros-Long findings).
58
See BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 148, 192; see also Liechty & Anderson, supra
note 1, at 306–07.
59
BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 148.
52
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within the survey pools to the degree necessary to permit as detailed an
analysis as in Bohen and Viveros-Long’s study. Nevertheless, considering
even the shared characteristics of the workers within the survey pools
reveals a potentially significant limit to the work/family benefits that were
documented in both projects. Most importantly, the workers in both
studies shared one crucial similarity: they all worked at or very near a
regular, forty-hour work week before the transition to a compressed
schedule occurred.
In the Facer and Wadsworth study, which found positive work/family
effects from introducing a four-day, forty-hour work week among city
government workers, 85.9% of the respondents who were working the
four-day schedule reported no change in their overall hours since they
transitioned from the five-day work week.60 An additional 9.6% of the
respondents had experienced a decrease in their overall working hours
since moving to the four-day work week61 (likely due to a decrease in
periodic overtime once the regular work day became ten hours per day). In
the Vega and Gilbert study of patrol officers, which also found overall
positive work/family effects from the adoption of a compressed work
week, ninety-seven percent of the respondents were male, and all of them
had been working a five-day, forty-hour schedule before transitioning to a
three-day, forty-hour week.62
This observation is important in assessing the significance and
generalizability of these studies’ findings for two related reasons. First,
workers who have a regular forty-hour work week are typically among
those who experience relatively low levels of work/family conflict as an
initial starting point.63 Thus, Bohen and Viveros-Long’s conclusion that
workers with the least severe work/family conflicts are likely to be helped
the most by flextime arrangements may apply to the four-day work week
context as well. Second, the percentage of the workforce that regularly
works forty-hour-per-week jobs—which are most easily transitioned to a
four-day work week—has been decreasing over the last three decades.64
Thus, many workers with the most severe work/family conflicts are likely
to be among those least likely to gain access to a four-day work week
altogether. This is not an indictment of the very important results that both
the Facer and Wadsworth study and the Vega and Gilbert study produced
60
Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules, supra note 12, at 170 (noting that only 14.1%
of the respondents who worked the four-day schedule reported a change in overall working hours).
61
Id.
62
Vega & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 393–95.
63
See infra notes 71–77 and accompanying text.
64
JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 32–33, 33 fig.1.4 (reporting a ten percent decline between
1970 and 2000 in the percentage of the workforce working a forty-hour work week, and explaining
that, although the average work week remained stable, “[v]ariation around the average has increased,
marking the emergence of both longer and shorter workweeks for different groups of workers”).
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by demonstrating in a rigorous and compelling manner that a compressed
work week can reduce work/family conflicts for many workers who are
able to access such schedules. These observations merely suggest the
potentially narrow group of workers for whom such results are likely to
apply.65
These limitations are predicted by the work of sociologists Jerry A.
Jacobs and Kathleen Gerson, who have documented a “growing time
divide” within the American labor force.66 Since 1970, the forty-hour
work week has become increasingly less typical for both women and
men,67 as occupations have become increasingly divided between “jobs
that demand excessively long days and jobs that provide neither sufficient
time nor money to meet workers’ needs.”68 This bifurcation of working
hours has both gender and class effects.69 Low-hour, part-time jobs are
held predominantly by women, while long-hour, full-time jobs are held
predominantly by men.70 The relatively small group of women who are
laboring at the long end of the time divide, typically as managers or
professionals, often experience high levels of work/family conflict as a
result of workplace norms that demand extremely long hours.71 The larger
group of women who are laboring at the short end of the time divide also
frequently experience high levels of work/family conflict, often as the
result of unpredictable schedules, number of hours, and income.72 This
65
See Facer & Wadsworth, Alternative Work Schedules, supra note 12, at 176 (acknowledging
that their study is “of a limited group,” and encouraging additional research).
66
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 5, 36, 60, 63 (analyzing the results of a national survey
in the 1990s of over 3000 workers); see also Vicki Schultz & Allison Hoffman, The Need for a
Reduced Workweek in the United States, in PRECARIOUS WORK, WOMEN, AND THE NEW ECONOMY:
THE CHALLENGE TO LEGAL NORMS 131, 132 (Judy Fudge & Rosemary Owen eds., 2006) (describing
the growing bifurcation of working hours).
67
JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 32–33, 33 fig.1.4.
68
Id. at 8.
69
See Michelle A. Travis, The Future of Work-Family Policy: Is “Choice” the Right Choice?, 13
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 385, 403–14 (2009) [hereinafter Travis, Work-Family Policy]; see also
JOAN C. WILLIAMS ET AL., CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, “OPT OUT” OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS
COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT 29 (2006), available at http://www.uchastings.edu/site_files/WLL/
OptOutPushedOut.pdf.
70
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 33 fig.1.4, 34 tbl.1.2, 35. In 2000, over twenty-six
percent of men in the U.S. were working fifty or more hours per week, while less than nine percent
were working less than thirty hours per week. Id. During the same year, less than twelve percent of
women were working fifty or more hours per week, while nearly twenty percent were working thirty
hours or less. Id.
71
See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 29–31; Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at
405–06.
72
See Ronald E. Bulanda & Stephen Lippmann, Wrinkles in Parental Time with Children: Work,
Family Structure, and Gender, 13 MICH. FAM. REV. 5, 10–12 (2009) (explaining how the “resurgence
of irregular and unpredictable nonstandard work shifts,” which are typically involuntary for lowincome workers, contributes to severe work/family conflicts for workers in low-income jobs); Posting
of Liz Watson & Jessica Glenn to Work and Family Blog, http://wfnetwork.bc.edu/blog/
flexible-work-arrangements-improving-job-quality-and-workforce-stability-for-low-wage-workers-and
-their-employers (Sept. 7, 2009) (explaining that low-income workers often face acute work/family
conflicts because they are “more likely to face involuntary part-time work, rigid or unpredictable
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group of low-income women frequently faces even more rigid workplace
environments than high-income women, often risking severe job
consequences or job loss for even minor schedule breaches due to
caregiving obligations.73
Evidence suggests that this growing bifurcation of jobs into long-hour
and short-hour positions is not a straightforward reflection of workers’
preferences,74 as a growing majority of workers report a mismatch between
their actual and ideal working hours.75 The growing group of workers at
the high end of the time divide typically would prefer to work less, while
the growing group of workers at the low end of the time divide frequently
would prefer to work more.76 Workers who are unhappy with their number
schedules, or night, evening and weekend work,” as well as “unstable income and job loss”). See also
generally JOAN C. WILLIAMS, CTR. FOR WORKLIFE LAW, ONE SICK CHILD AWAY FROM BEING FIRED:
WHEN “OPTING OUT” IS NOT AN OPTION (2006) [hereinafter WILLIAMS, ONE SICK CHILD], available
at http://www.worklifelaw.org/pubs/onesickchild.pdf (describing the unique aspects of low-income
jobs that contribute to severe work/family conflicts).
73
See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 35–36; WILLIAMS, ONE SICK CHILD, supra note 72, at
3, 8–14; see also JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 104 (finding from survey results that white-collar
workers have more job flexibility and control over their work schedules than blue-collar workers);
Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 313 (noting that “professionals are more likely to have access to
voluntary flexible work schedules than lower wage employees,” that “many low-income families
endure highly complex, time-pressed lives in order to survive,” and that “the families who are most
economically stressed are often the ones whose jobs offer the least flexibility or security in the face of
family needs”); Michael Selmi & Naomi Cahn, Women in the Workplace: Which Women, Which
Agenda?, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 7, 13–17 (2006) (explaining the reasons why, “[d]espite
their longer hours, professional workers often have the most flexibility and control over their work
time”). In general, “most flexible work options are contingent upon worker technological savvy and
professional autonomy . . . which exclude most low-wage workers.” Liechty & Anderson, supra note
1, at 313. Not only do women working short-hour, part-time positions face workplace rigidity, but they
also face long-lasting decreases in occupational mobility, compensation, benefits, and promotion
opportunities. See JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 96–100 (2000); WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 30–31; Travis, WorkFamily Policy, supra note 69, at 412. For additional, related commentary presented at this Symposium,
see generally Shirley Lung, The Four Day Work Week: But What About Ms. Coke, Ms. Upton, and Ms.
Blankenship?, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1119 (2010).
74
See Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at 412–14; see also JACOBS & GERSON, supra
note 5, at 5 (concluding from a national survey of over 3000 workers in the 1990s that “workers’ actual
time at work does not necessarily reflect their desires”).
75
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 64 tbl.3.1, 65–67, 77 (reporting data from 1997 and
concluding that “most American workers experience a significant gap between how much they work
and how much they would like to work,” and that this group is growing over time); WILLIAMS ET AL.,
supra note 69, at 30 (describing a national survey of 500 dual-career families in which sixty-five
percent of women in full-time jobs reported wanting to work part-time). In a 1997 survey, only onefifth of workers surveyed reported that their actual working hours matched their ideal working hours,
while three-fifths reported that their actual hours were longer than their ideal, and one-fifth reported
that their actual hours were shorter than their ideal. JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 64 tbl.3.1.
These figures do not include the unemployed, who should be added to those who desire greater
working hours. Id. at 64.
76
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 5, 36, 60, 63 (drawing this conclusion from the results
of a national survey of over 3000 workers during the 1990s); see also Schultz & Hoffman, supra note
66, at 132–33, 149 (advocating for an expanded supply of short-hour, full-time jobs). Because men are
over-represented in long-hour jobs and women are over-represented in short-hour, part-time positions,
“[t]he result is many fathers working longer hours than they would like and many mothers working
fewer hours than they would like.” WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 3.
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of working hours most frequently cite as “ideal” a job that would allow
combining caregiving responsibilities with approximately thirty to forty
hours of paid work per week.77 While this aspiration unites workers across
both gender and class lines,78 it is becoming increasingly difficult to realize
as fewer workers are able to regularly work close to forty hours per week.79
This research suggests that the four-day work week will at best be a
partial solution to the multi-faceted sources of work/family conflict.
Despite its recent explosion, the use of a four-day work week is unlikely to
become available either for workers whose jobs currently demand hours in
excess of forty or fifty per week, or for workers whose jobs often provide
variable hours that routinely fall below twenty per week. While a four-day
work week may provide very real work/family benefits for the decreasing
portion of the workforce that is currently laboring at or near a forty-hour
work week, those workers tend to be among the group whose work/family
conflicts are both the least acute and the most easily resolved. This
explains why some work/family scholars have focused their sights on legal
and policy initiatives for expanding the supply of high-quality, thirty-five
to forty-hour jobs, rather than on increasing working time flexibility.80
Even for workers who are able to gain access to a four-day work week,
a closer look at the research raises doubts about the ability of the four-day
work week to do more than just alleviate work/family pressures by
compressing work hours and thereby freeing up larger blocks of time.
That benefit is certainly important and produces measurable reductions in
work/family conflict, as documented in the studies described above. A
deeper analysis of the research, however, suggests that the four-day work
week is unlikely to make meaningful inroads into the gendered division of
labor that contributes so significantly to many women’s conflicting work
and family demands. Even though both men and women were among the
77
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 64–69; WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 30; Travis,
Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at 412–13. In a very large 1997 survey, employees were
categorized by their current number of working hours per week: employees working less than thirty
hours; employees working thirty to thirty-nine hours; employees working forty to forty-nine hours;
employees working fifty to fifty-nine hours; and employees working sixty or more hours. JACOBS &
GERSON, supra note 5, at 66 fig.3.1. The average number of hours reported as “ideal” within each of
these categories was strikingly similar, regardless of gender. Id. Male workers’ “ideal” ranged from
approximately thirty-two to forty-two hours per week, while female workers’ “ideal” ranged from
approximately twenty-seven to forty-one hours per week. Id.
78
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 78; Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra note 69, at
412–13.
79
See JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 77; see also WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 69, at 30
(emphasizing the “inability to find good jobs requiring 30 to 40 hours per week,” and noting that “[t]he
United States has relatively few good, 35 to 40 hour per week jobs”). One study has found that among
employed workers between the ages of twenty-five and fifty, only three percent of men and less than
nine percent of women work between thirty-five and forty hours per week. See WILLIAMS ET AL.,
supra note 69, at 30.
80
See generally Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 66; see also Travis, Work-Family Policy, supra
note 69, at 412–25.
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high percentages of workers who provided generally positive responses
about the impact of compressed work schedules on work/family balance,
the four-day work week may not be moving women much closer to
achieving equality.81
In the Gilbert and Vega study of patrol officers, for example, actual
work/family benefits may not be reflected simply by the fact that, when
specifically asked to rate the degree to which a compressed schedule
affected their ability to devote time to family members, 85.3% of the
nearly all-male respondents reported that it had made it “‘easier’ or ‘much
easier’” to do so.82 When the patrol officers were asked in an open-ended
question to identify what they found to be the most favorable aspect of the
compressed work week, 88.3% said that it gave them a greater opportunity
to participate in off-duty employment—in other words, that a compressed
work week allowed them to take a second paid job.83 To the extent that
male workers use the scheduling flexibility of a compressed work week to
take on additional paid work, rather than to share a greater proportion of
family caregiving, a critical component of many women’s work/family
conflicts will remain unaddressed.
A detailed assessment of the earlier 1970 study of four-day workers at
thirteen different firms, which is described above, raises similar concerns.
Although seventy-five percent of the workers surveyed reported spending
more time with their families when working a four-day rather than a fiveday work week, the study also found that the four-day work week
“contributes significantly to moonlighting,” particularly for men.84 The
percentage of respondents who reported holding a second job quadrupled
from four percent when working a five-day work week to seventeen
percent after moving to a compressed four-day schedule.85 The researchers
believe that these percentages likely under-report the actual level of
moonlighting, based on worker responses to interview questions regarding
co-worker behavior and the fact that many of the employers had an express
policy of firing workers for taking a second job.86
81
For reflections on the issue of gender equality in the context of the four-day work week
appearing in this Symposium Issue, see generally Vicki Schultz, Feminism and Workplace Flexibility,
42 CONN. L. REV. 1203 (2010).
82
Vega & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 394–95. The respondents were ninety-seven percent male,
which reflected the demographics of the patrol division at that time. Id. at 394.
83
Id. at 395. During the first year that the patrol officers worked the three-day, forty-hour
schedule, they reported performing a similar number of hours on off-duty jobs as in the prior year while
working a traditional five-day, forty-hour schedule. Id. at 400. Thus, it is unclear whether the
perceived opportunity to increase paid work actually translated into increased participation in the paid
labor market, at least in the period immediately following implementation of the three-day schedule.
84
See Steele & Poor, supra note 31, at 105, 110, 115.
85
Id. at 105, 109–10. The percentage of workers in the study who reported holding a second job
while working a five-day work week was similar to the percentage of second job holders in the
American labor force generally, which at the time of the study was five percent. Id.
86
Id.
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Most importantly, the study found that although the increase in
moonlighting existed for both women and men, it was more pronounced
with men. Twenty percent of the male respondents, but only ten percent of
the female respondents, reported engaging in additional paid work after
moving to the four-day work week.87 Conversely, when respondents were
asked in an open-ended question to name the advantages of working a
four-day work week, some of the women—but none of the men—said that
the four-day work week gave them an extra day to perform housework.88
Similarly, among the respondents who had started work at their firms after
the four-day work week was already in place, some of the women—but
none of the men—said that they chose the job because the four-day work
week gave them more time to devote to housework and family.89 While
these data do not negate the fact that the majority of both women and men
found that the four-day work week enabled increased time with family, the
findings do suggest that the four-day work week is unlikely to move
workers much closer to a dual-earner, dual-carer model, which many
work/family advocates believe is critical to achieving gender equality.90
Of course, for low-income families, the ability of a compressed work
week to allow workers, particularly men, to work a second paid job may be
more important than equalizing the gendered division of labor, to the
extent that insufficient family income is itself a major source of
work/family stress. In the Vega and Gilbert study, for example, many of
the patrol officers viewed the compressed work week as providing an
important opportunity to supplement their low salaries.91 Nevertheless,
this research provides a more nuanced understanding of the particular ways
in which the four-day work week can and cannot address the variety of
sources that contribute to work/family conflict.
These findings regarding compressed work schedules are consistent
with results from the Bohen and Viveros-Long study, described above, on
the effects of flextime in federal agencies under the AWSA. One of the
study’s objectives was “to see if husbands and wives divided family work
more equally in their families when one spouse had a flexitime option.”92
The researchers found that flextime “does not appear to encourage men to
share home chores or child rearing with their wives,” as the male workers
reported engaging in the same percent of the family’s domestic work,

87

Id. at 105, 110.
Id. at 105, 111.
89
Id. at 108.
90
See JANET C. GORNICK & MARCIA K. MEYERS, FAMILIES THAT WORK: POLICIES FOR
RECONCILING PARENTHOOD AND EMPLOYMENT 85–86 (2003).
91
See Vega & Gilbert, supra note 27, at 395.
92
BOHEN & VIVEROS-LONG, supra note 39, at 135.
88
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whether they were on a flextime or a traditional schedule.
Thus, as a whole, the research that attempts either to identify the
workers most likely to benefit from a four-day work week or to assess the
actual behavioral changes that a four-day work week is likely to produce
should temper the initial enthusiasm that a four-day work week might
otherwise engender among work/family advocates. While this research
raises serious questions about the extent to which a four-day work week is
likely to assist those most in need, there is one particular group of workers
for whom a four-day work week holds very real promise for ameliorating
acute work/family conflicts. This group is made up of shift workers who
regularly perform some or all of their work outside of normal business
hours.94
Many studies have found that shift workers—even those working at or
near forty hours per week—frequently experience both harmful health
effects and high levels of work/family conflict.95 Many shift workers,
particularly in the healthcare, police services, manufacturing, and energy
industries, find the negative effects from working asocial hours
compounded by highly unstable schedules on rotating, variable, or
irregular shifts.96 Because shift workers often work forty-hour work
weeks—albeit forty highly undesirable hours each week—their jobs have
provided a useful laboratory for experimenting with compressed work
schedules. A large set of studies has found that many shift workers
experience meaningful improvements in their ability to balance work and
family by transitioning to various forms of compressed work weeks.97
This is particularly the case when the compressed work schedule not only
frees up additional days where no work is performed, but also regularizes
working hours.98
Although the research on shift workers is very encouraging, the
potentially limited population of workers whose severe work/family
conflicts are likely to be addressed through a four-day work week might
93
See id. at 135, 137; see also Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 306–07 (describing the
Bohen and Viveros-Long study and concluding that flextime was “insufficient to . . . alter household
labor equity for those women who already had a high level of objective family-work conflicts and
stressors to manage”).
94
See Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 765.
95
See id. at 764; Jennifer A. Warren & Phyllis J. Johnson, The Impact of Workplace Support on
Work-Family Role Strain, 44 FAM. REL. 163, 164 (1995).
96
See Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 766 (describing the industries most likely to employ shift
workers); Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 313 (noting that “‘forced flexibility’ such as
nonstandard, shift, or rotating work hours is associated with low wages, poor job security, and health
risks”); Warren & Johnson, supra note 95, at 164 (finding an association between irregular and variable
shifts and high levels of work/family conflict).
97
See Bambra et al., supra note 34, at 766, 768–73 (conducting a meta-analysis of forty studies of
the effect that a compressed work week has on the work/family balance of shift-workers and
concluding that the majority of studies found improved work/family balance after the compressed work
week was introduced).
98
See id. at 764–73.
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lead work/family advocates to prioritize other policy initiatives. A unique
confluence of other concerns, however, including the economic crisis,
environmental pressures to reduce oil consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions, and increasing commute times, have all contributed to an
immediate focus on expanding and experimenting with four-day work
weeks and other compressed schedule designs. Work/family advocates
should not miss this opportunity to play an active role in shaping the
debate over the use, design, and potential legal regulation of the four-day
work week to maximize its effectiveness as a work/family balance tool.
The research on shift workers provides some initial insight into at least one
important design criteria by highlighting the significance of scheduling
predictability. Other research additionally has documented the importance
of voluntary participation and worker control in ensuring that flexible work
schedules are indeed “family-friendly.”99 Part III considers how potential
legal regulation of the four-day work week might best incorporate these
insights, as well as considering what lessons existing regulation in this
context might reveal about regulatory reform efforts around workplace
flexibility more generally.
III. A COLLECTIVE REFLEXIVE APPROACH TO REGULATING
THE FOUR-DAY WORK WEEK
Work/family discourse about the legal regulation of workplace
flexibility has focused primarily on three general approaches. This section
briefly summarizes those approaches and considers how they might apply
in the context of the four-day work week. This section then highlights an
under-developed variant of one of those approaches and considers what it
might offer to work/family advocates who are interested in finding
regulatory methods to maximize the effectiveness of compressed work
schedules as a work/family balance tool.
The first general approach for regulating workplace flexibility is a
traditional “command-and-control” strategy that relies on prescriptive rules
with sanctions for non-compliance.100 This form of “top-down” regulation
is typically outcomes-oriented, often focusing on expanding substantive

99

See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 313.
See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Public Law and Private Process: Toward an Incentivized
Organizational Justice Model of Equal Employment Quality for Caregivers, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 25, 64
(describing this as a “proscriptive rule-oriented” approach to regulating employer conduct); Cynthia
Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319,
328 (2005) (describing this approach as relying on the “enactment and centralized enforcement of
uniform rules and standards”); Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 475 (2001) (describing this as a “rule-enforcement
approach” that “treats regulation as punishing violations of predefined legal rules”).
100
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rights and responsibilities.
Reasonable accommodation mandates are
one example of this approach.102
The use of top-down substantive legal rules has been criticized on a
variety of grounds.103 Many commentators describe this type of regulatory
strategy as a “one-size-fits-all” approach that fails to recognize not only the
diverse interests of stakeholders (e.g., the heterogeneous needs of workers
with caregiving responsibilities),104 but also fails to recognize the validity
of private economic concerns.105 Commentators have been particularly
skeptical about the ability of top-down regulatory methods to address
subtle structural and organizational sources of gender discrimination in the
workplace, including inflexible schedules and other working time norms.
Specifically, scholars have highlighted the difficulty of crafting substantive
rules that are appropriately responsive to complex workplace dynamics and
relationships,106 the risk of judicial capture of substantive mandates,107 and
the inability of command-and-control regulations to stimulate viable,

101
See Lobel, supra note 11, at 344–45; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 28–29
(distinguishing traditional proposals for regulating workplace flexibility by expanding substantive
rights from alternative process-based approaches); Simon Deakin & Colm McLaughlin, The Regulation
of Women’s Pay: From Individual Rights to Reflexive Law?, in WOMEN AND EMPLOYMENT:
CHANGING LIVES AND NEW CHALLENGES 313, 319–20 (Jacqueline Scott et al. eds., 2008) (describing
command-and-control approaches as “prescriptive” and outcomes-oriented, in contrast to “reflexive”
regulation that is process-based and “validates a range of potential solutions”).
102
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 28, 45.
103
See Estlund, supra note 100, at 340–41.
104
See Lobel, supra note 11, at 380–81; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 29–30, 45
(arguing that procedural legal mandates may “achieve individually tailored solutions that may in some
instances prove superior to what could be achieved under externally imposed substantive mandates,”
which often lack the ability “to address the divergent needs and circumstances of all caregivers”).
105
See Lobel, supra note 11, at 379–80; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 43–44
(questioning “the normative basis for placing additional responsibilities on employers”).
106
See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 36–42, 65 (analyzing the limits of re-interpreting
antidiscrimination mandates as a means of increasing workplace flexibility for caregivers and
concluding that “[i]t is extraordinarily difficult to envision an appropriately responsive method of direct
regulation” to address second-generation workplace exclusion); Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace
Context: Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 661 (2003) (arguing
that “the contextual nature of the problem of modern workplace discrimination requires a similarly
contextualized solution,” and that “[t]here simply is no single answer that will work in all organizations
to eliminate institutionalized forms of discrimination”); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and
Discrimination, 93 CAL. L. REV. 623, 629 (2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture] (arguing that
“discriminatory work cultures are too complex and too intertwined with valuable social relations to be
easily regulated through judicial pronouncements and direct regulation”); Tristin K. Green &
Alexandra Kalev, Discrimination-Reducing Measures at the Relational Level, 59 HAST. L.J. 1435,
1436, 1454–56 (2008) (describing how traditional antidiscrimination mandates may inhibit employers’
ability to address “relational sources of discrimination”); Sturm, supra note 100, at 475 (explaining
why the complexity, subtlety, and contextualized nature of “second generation” workplace
discrimination “cannot be reduced to a fixed code of specific rules or commands”).
107
See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Afterword: Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 476, 485–87 (2000); see also Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of
Employment Discrimination Law, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 21–46 (2005) [hereinafter Travis,
Recapturing] (describing the process of judicial capture of the Americans with Disabilities Act’s
reasonable accommodation mandate and of Title VII’s disparate impact theory).
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individually-tailored solutions.
In addition, because traditional
substantive rule making “presupposes an adversarial relationship between
worker and employer,” this approach often encourages employers to focus
on short-term strategies for avoiding liability rather than on engaging in
creative problem solving to address the structural and organizational
sources of work/family conflict.109 As a result, top-down regulatory
strategies are unlikely to engender in employers the necessary commitment
to social change upon which a work/family agenda ultimately depends.110
The second general approach to increasing workplace flexibility lies at
the other end of the spectrum from command-and-control strategies. This
is the market-based governance approach, which relies not on legal
intervention, but on making the market work more efficiently as a
laboratory for workplace flexibility.111 This approach often focuses on
making the business case for workplace flexibility and maximizing
information exchange to facilitate employers’ voluntary experimentation
with working time innovation.112 This approach is being used by
organizations such as the Project for Attorney Retention, A Better Balance,
and others, which disseminate research, provide training, and conduct
outreach to educate employers about how flexible hour arrangements may
produce financial benefits through reduced turnover, increased
productivity, lower absenteeism, and enhanced recruiting.113
In the context of the four-day work week, this market-based approach
is illustrated by the “Diversity & Flexibility Connection” initiative recently
undertaken by a dozen major corporations seeking greater diversity among
108

See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 29.
See id. at 67; see also Sturm, supra note 100, at 475–76 (observing that top-down regulation
“induces firms to adopt strategies that reduce the short-term risk of legal exposure rather than strategies
that address the underlying problem”).
110
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 29.
111
See Michael Selmi, The Work-Family Conflict: An Essay on Employers, Men and
Responsibility, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 573, 574, 582–85 (2007) (describing the market-based
governance approach).
112
See id.; see also WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 73, at 88–93 (describing
evidence of the business case for increased workplace flexibility); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 107,
at 12 (summarizing evidence of the potential financial benefits from workplace flexibility).
113
Information about the Project for Attorney Retention is available at http://www.pardc.org/,
which includes links to various reports and best practice guides for employers to implement costeffective flexible-hour and reduced-hour policies. Specific examples of attempts to use the business
case for flexibility as a way to alter employers’ behavior are readily available online. See, e.g., ANNA
DANZIGER & SHELLEY WATERS, WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY 2010, THE BUSINESS CASE FOR FLEXIBLE
WORK ARRANGEMENTS 1–2 (2008), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/workplaceflexibility
2010/definition/documents/BusinessCaseforFWAs.pdf; DANA E. FRIEDMAN, FAMILIES & WORK INST.,
WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR COMPANIES 1–5, available at http://www.familiesandwork.
org/3w/tips/downloads/companies.pdf; JENNIFER E. SWANBERG ET AL., CITISALES STUDY ISSUE BRIEF
NO. 3, CAN BUSINESS BENEFIT BY PROVIDING WORKPLACE FLEXIBILITY TO HOURLY WORKERS? 1–6,
available at http://www.citisalesstudy.com/_pdfs/IB3-HourlyWorkers.pdf; A Better Balance, Fact
Sheet: The Business Case for Workplace Flexibility, http://abetterbalance.org/cms/index2.php?option=
com_docman&task=doc_view&gid=24&Itemid=99999999 (last visited Apr. 6, 2010).
109
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114

the attorneys employed by their outside law firms.
These corporations
voluntarily began to demand that their outside law firms demonstrate a
commitment to flexible work policies, often by including on their legal
accounts at least one part-time attorney (often someone on a four-day work
week), as a condition for securing their legal business.115 In addition to
directing their business to law firms that are committed to workplace
flexibility, the companies’ general counsel have been educating law firms
about the costs that clients incur from attorney attrition caused by a longhour work culture that expects employees to be available seven days per
week.116
Although many work/family advocates have been focusing increased
attention on these types of educational campaigns, commentators have
widely criticized reliance on purely market-based approaches to address
employees’ work/family conflicts.117 Most scholars view the market as
insufficient, on its own, to achieve meaningful progress toward workplace
justice, equality, or flexibility, due to imperfect information, the effects of
cognitive biases, and other sources of market inefficiencies.118 Scholars
have identified a variety of reasons why employers may not respond to the
growing evidence of a link between workplace flexibility and business
efficiency.119 For example, many firms lack the necessary “organizational
systems” that would allow them to identify the ways in which workplace
flexibility might produce financial gains, either at the workplace level or
on an individual employee basis.120 These structural and procedural
deficiencies in obtaining relevant information are exacerbated by most
employers’ focus on short-term cost-benefit measures, rather than on
measures of long-term economic and productivity gains.121 In addition,
there are some situations in which work/family objectives and efficiency
simply conflict and external legal regulation is therefore necessary to
114
See Karen Sloan, Companies Push for Flexible Schedules To Boost Women Attorneys,
LAW.COM, Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/law/LawArticleFriendly.jsp?id=1202436003132.
115
See id.
116
See id.
117
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 67.
118
See, e.g., Sturm, supra note 100, at 478.
119
See, e.g., Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 55, 67–68 (explaining why synergies between
family-friendly workplace practices and economic business interests “are not likely to be achieved
wholly through market forces”); Travis, Recapturing, supra note 107, at 9–21 (analyzing the role of
cognitive bias in employment decision making to help “explain why data revealing the economic
benefits of flexible work arrangements have not produced significant changes by presumably
economically efficient employers”).
120
See Sturm, supra note 100, at 478; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 55, 67–68
(explaining that a “necessary precondition” for employers to recognize potential financial gains from
workplace flexibility “is the creation of a safe forum in which to identify and explore change,” and in
which an employer and an employee “can educate each other through an objective process”).
121
See Sturm, supra note 100, at 478; see also Travis, Recapturing, supra note 107, at 89 (noting
the importance of focusing on long-term cost-benefit analysis when assessing the economic gains that
employers might realize from workplace accommodations).
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ensure that workers with caregiving responsibilities are not discriminated
against or excluded in the pursuit of rational economic objectives.122
In between these two primary approaches to addressing workplace
flexibility—either through top-down rule making or market-based
methods—lies the “new governance” approach, which instead emphasizes
public oversight of private, regulatory initiatives.123 The new governance
approach often relies on various forms of “reflexive law,” which focus on
imposing procedural rather than substantive obligations to facilitate
business self-regulation.124 The new governance scholars have made a
compelling case that this middle-ground approach may provide a viable
solution to the shortcomings of both top-down substantive rules and of
imperfect market mechanisms by recognizing that “economic efficiency
and democratic legitimacy can be mutually reinforcing.”125
Several examples of new governance strategies come from the United
Kingdom, which has been a leader in experimenting with reflexive legal
regulation in the workplace. One example is a U.K. Code of Practice that
gives individual employees the right to request certain information from
their employers to help them assess their relative compensation when they
believe that they may be experiencing sex-based pay discrimination.126
122
See Sturm, supra note 100, at 478; see also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 67 (suggesting
that “the business case for flexible and other employee-friendly management practices may be
somewhat overstated”); Selmi, supra note 111, at 583–85 (arguing that “there are very little reliable
data to support the productivity benefits of flexible workplaces,” and that advocates have inadequately
explained “why more employers have not adopted flexible workplace practices” if they are indeed
“efficient”).
123
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 63–74; Lobel, supra note 11, at 344–45; see also
Estlund, supra note 100, at 377–83 (proposing a system of monitored employer self-regulation as an
alternative to top-down enforcement of labor standards); Green, Work Culture, supra note 106, at 627–
29, 664–83 (proposing a set of “legal incentives that will facilitate contextual problem solving by
employers” as a more effective way to regulate discriminatory work cultures than relying “on courts to
articulate and enforce specific, across-the-board rules”); Sturm, supra note 100, at 553–67 (proposing
regulatory reforms that focus on incentivizing employers to voluntarily adopt structural problemsolving methods to address workplace discrimination).
124
See Deakin & McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 313–14, 319–20; Lobel, supra note 11, at 345;
see also Michelle A. Travis, Employment Protection for Atypical Workers: Proceedings of the 2006
Annual Meeting, Association of American Law Schools Section on Labor Relations and Employment
Law, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 233, 266–69 (2006) [hereinafter Travis, Atypical Workers]
(describing the “shift in codifying rights in terms of process, rather than substantive outcomes”);
Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans With Disabilities Act
Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 356 n.273 (2009) [hereinafter Travis,
Lashing Back] (noting “the recent scholarly trend to promote the value of process-based solutions for
reducing employment discrimination and advancing worker rights”); Travis, Work-Family Policy,
supra note 69, at 425–29 (considering the role that reflexive law might play in a work/family policy
agenda).
125
Lobel, supra note 11, at 344. See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 67 (describing
procedural mandates as “a possible middle ground” that might address “the dichotomous tension
between substantive regulation and deregulated markets”).
126
See Deakin & McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 317–18 (describing the Code of Practice on
Equal Pay, issued by the United Kingdom’s Equal Opportunities Commission in 2003 to help ensure
compliance with laws prohibiting sex-based compensation discrimination); see also generally EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES COMMISSION, CODE OF PRACTICE ON EQUAL PAY, available at http://www.equality
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While providing no new substantive entitlements, this procedural right
enables an individual employee to obtain—and an employer to pay
appropriate attention to—relevant information about workplace
inequalities.
More relevant to the four-day work week is the United Kingdom’s
Employment Act of 2002127 and its related Flexible Working
Regulations128 (collectively, the “U.K. Employment Act”). The U.K.
Employment Act grants certain employees the right to request a change in
the number of hours, times, or days in their work schedule,129 and it
prohibits employers from retaliating against employees for making such a
request.130 This law would protect, for example, an employee who asks for
a four-day work week schedule. This “right to request” does not entitle
employees to any particular outcome regarding their working hours.
Instead, it establishes a mandatory procedure ensuring that the employer
will meaningfully consider the employee’s request.131
Under the U.K. Employment Act, an employee must initiate the
process by filing with an employer a detailed written request for a specific
alternative work schedule that addresses, among other things, how to
mitigate any anticipated effects that the proposed schedule might have on

humanrights.com/uploaded_files/code_of_practice_equalpay.pdf. While the Code of Practice on Equal
Pay is not binding law, an employer’s failure to comply with its provisions is admissible evidence
before a legal tribunal in cases alleging sex-based compensation discrimination. See CODE OF
PRACTICE ON EQUAL PAY, supra, at 2, ¶3. The Code provides that “[a] woman is entitled to write to
her employer asking for information that will help her establish whether she has received equal pay and
if not, what the reasons for the pay difference are.” Id. at 9, ¶37. The government has provided a
standard form, known as “The Equal Pay Questionnaire,” which an employee may use for this purpose
either before filing a legal claim or within twenty-one days after filing. Id. If an employer fails to
respond to the request within eight weeks (without a reasonable excuse), or if an employer provides “an
evasive or equivocal reply,” a legal tribunal may infer that the employer has no legitimate basis for an
identified pay difference. See id. at 9, ¶38.
127
Employment Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.) (adding § 8A to the Employment Rights Act, 1996,
c. 18 (U.K.)).
128
The Flexible Working (Eligibility, Complaints and Remedies) Regulations, 2002, S.I.
2002/3236 (U.K.); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/3207
(U.K.).
129
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80F(1) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act,
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)). Eligible employees include those who have worked for their employer
continuously for twenty-six weeks and who have a child under age six or a disabled child under age
eighteen, or who are providing care for an adult relative. Equality and Human Rights Commission,
Family Friendly Working: What the Law Says, http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/your-rights/
gender/sex-discrimination-your-rights-at-work/family-friendly-working/family-friendly-working-whatthe-law-says/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
130
The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I. 2002/3207, art. 16
(U.K.).
131
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 75–78 (describing the U.K. Employment Act to
illustrate process-based regulation that does not obligate an employer to adopt any particular work
schedule, but instead requires the employer to “seriously consider the request”); Travis, Atypical
Workers, supra note 124, at 266–68 (describing the U.K. Employment Act as an example of processbased regulation to initiate meaningful consideration of workplace flexibility requests).
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the employer’s operations. An employer must respond to an employee’s
request for a four-day work week or other alternative work schedule within
twenty-eight days, either by granting the request or by setting up an
individual meeting with the employee to discuss the request.133 The
employer must notify the employee of its final decision within fourteen
days of the meeting.134 If the employer denies the employee’s request, it
must provide a written response that identifies one or more reasons for the
denial from a specific list of business-related grounds enumerated in the
Act.135 The enumerated reasons include, among others, that the
employee’s request would make the employer unable to meet customer
demands, or that there would be insufficient work available during the
hours that the employee wants to work.136
Within fourteen days of receiving the employer’s final response, an
employee may file an internal appeal with the employer seeking review of
a denial.137 The employer must meet with the employee to discuss the
appeal and must provide a written response to the appeal within fourteen
days of that meeting.138 The employee then may appeal an employer’s
denial to an outside tribunal, but only on very limited grounds.139 The
outside tribunal will defer to the employer’s business judgment and will
assess only whether the employer followed the statutory procedure,
whether the employer’s basis for denying the employee’s request included
at least one of the statutorily-enumerated reasons, and whether the
employer’s denial was based on erroneous facts.140
132
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80F(2) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act,
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)). See also Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76–77 (describing the
information that an employee must include in a request for an alternative work schedule under the U.K.
Employment Act).
133
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(a) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act,
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I.
2002/3207, art. 3 (U.K.).
134
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(b) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002,
S.I. 2002/3207, art. 4 (U.K.).
135
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(c) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act,
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I.
2002/3207, art. 5 (U.K.).
136
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(1)(b) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)).
137
Id. § 80G(2)(d); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I.
2002/3207, art. 6 (U.K.).
138
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(g)–(h) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002,
S.I. 2002/3207, arts. 8–10 (U.K.).
139
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80H(1) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act,
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I.
2002/3207, art. 15 (U.K.).
140
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80H(1) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment Act,
2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002, S.I.
2002/3207, art. 15 (U.K.).
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New governance scholars have praised the U.K. Employment Act as a
useful model for how reflexive laws may help develop organizational
practices to overcome the information deficiencies that render purely
Nevertheless, work/family
market-based mechanisms suspect.141
advocates who are familiar with the often deep institutional resistance to
working time innovation rightfully may be skeptical of a law that imposes
no substantive obligations on employers. The promise of the U.K.
Employment Act, however, lies in its particular selection of steps
governing the engagement of both sides in the process.142 Those steps are
designed to help facilitate the exchange of relevant information to
maximize the chances of identifying “mutually beneficial” solutions.143
Unlike top-down regulatory methods, the U.K. Employment Act’s processbased approach at least has the potential to encourage jointly-designed,
individually-tailored work schedules that are more responsive both to
employees’ diverse work/family circumstances and to employers’ diverse
business needs.144
Preliminary studies on the U.K. Employment Act provide some reason
for optimism.145 Research indicates that the number of employee requests
for alternative work schedules has increased since the law was enacted and
that employers voluntarily approve the majority of requests made by
eligible employees.146 In addition, most employers report that compliance
with the “right to request” procedures is not prohibitively costly.147 The
U.K. Employment Act thus provides a potentially useful model for
work/family advocates when considering how legal regulation might be
employed in the United States to maximize the work/family benefits of
compressed work schedules.
One of the most important examples of a reflexive regulatory proposal
in the United States is Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman’s thoughtful
articulation of an “incentivized organizational justice model” for future

141

See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76; Travis, Atypical Workers, supra note 124, at 268.
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76.
143
See id. In this way, the U.K. Employment Act’s procedures are similar to the “interactive
process” that is envisioned as part of employers’ compliance with the reasonable accommodation
mandate in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). See id. at 50–56; see also Travis,
Lashing Back, supra note 124, at 356–66 (describing how the ADA’s interactive process has stamped a
“procedural footprint in the workplace,” which facilitates relevant information exchange that “may
allow employers and employees to identify workplace modifications that will produce joint long-term
benefits”); Michelle A. Travis, Perceived Disabilities, Social Cognition, and “Innocent Mistakes,” 55
VAND. L. REV. 481, 576–77 (2002) (explaining how the ADA’s interactive process may provide a
“built-in laboratory” to help reduce cognitive biases that contribute to certain forms of workplace
discrimination).
144
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 78.
145
See id.
146
See id.
147
See id.
142
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work/family legislation.
Rather than granting or expanding substantive
accommodation rights to workers with caregiving responsibilities, ArnowRichman’s proposal would grant individual employees a new procedural
right.149 This right would obligate an employer to engage in a good faith
interactive process to meaningfully discuss an employee’s request for an
alternative work schedule.150 Unlike the U.K. Employment Act, this
proposal would rely on a more flexible “good faith” responsibility, rather
than mandating the specific content of the interactive process.151 An
employer’s failure to satisfy this responsibility would subject the employer
to monetary penalties to ensure that the “procedural obligations provide
meaningful incentives in their own right.”152
Professor Arnow-Richman suggests that one way to implement this
general model would be to amend the Family and Medical Leave Act
(“FMLA”), which currently grants covered employees at large employers
the substantive right to job-protected unpaid leave for specifically-defined
caregiving events.153 While the FMLA does not generally require an
employer to provide alternative work schedules, Arnow-Richman’s
proposal would obligate an employer to at least discuss such arrangements
when an employee experiences a qualifying caregiving event and when the

148
See id. at 27–29, 56–62. In this Symposium Issue, Professor Arnow-Richman further develops
her proposal for using law to encourage and mediate employers’ voluntary and individual
accommodation efforts through statutory procedural rights that enable and protect caregivers who seek
alternative work arrangements. See generally Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The
Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Family Balance, 42 CONN.
L. REV. 1081 (2010).
149
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 27–29, 56–62.
150
See id. at 56–62. This proposed obligation would be similar to the ADA’s interactive process
obligation except that it would add monetary penalties for an employer’s failure to comply, regardless
of the outcome on any underlying substantive claim. See id. at 56 (explaining that her proposal “adopts
the ADA interactive process concept, but makes the threat of a procedural violation meaningful through
the imposition of a statutory fee”).
151
See id. at 76.
152
Id. at 54, 56–58.
153
Id. at 30, 56–58. The FMLA covers employees who have worked for their employer for at
least twelve months and 1250 hours during the prior twelve-month period, if the employer is engaged
in commerce and has employed fifty or more employees for a specified time period. 29 U.S.C. §
2611(2)(A), 2611(4)(A) (2006). The FMLA provides such employees the right to unpaid, jobprotected leaves for specified time periods for the birth, adoption, or foster care placement of a new
child, to provide care for the serious health condition of an employee’s spouse, child, or parent, to
attend to an employee’s own serious health condition, or to attend to specifically-defined needs of
certain family members’ military obligations. Id. §§ 2612(a), 2612(c), 2614(a). Professor ArnowRichman’s proposal also would include a second component, which is “a judicially created burden shift
on proof of substantive violations of the FMLA and Title VII in cases where employers fail to engage
in a good-faith process and the plaintiff can demonstrate a prima facie case of retaliation or
discriminatory failure to accommodate.” Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 56, 58–62. This would
ensure not just monetary penalties for failure to meet the procedural obligations, but litigation penalties
as well.
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154

employee returns from a covered leave.
Although such an approach
would retain the limited coverage of the FMLA, which excludes many
employees, employers, and caregiving activities,155 Arnow-Richman
correctly observes that it may be a more politically viable first step in
experimenting with reflexive regulation in the United States, rather than
immediately seeking new legislation that would cover a broader group of
caregivers, as in the United Kingdom.156 Overall, Arnow-Richman’s
proposal is an extremely significant one for work/family advocates who are
seeking to most effectively regulate workplace flexibility. Her proposal
offers both the theoretical and practical foundation necessary to
operationalize a reflexive law approach “to enhance worker voice and
provide incentives for voluntary employer accommodation of
caregiving.”157
While these existing reflexive law models within the new governance
approach have much to offer work/family advocates who are considering
regulation of the four-day work week, the existing models share one
potential limitation: they depend upon the creation and exercise of
individual employee rights. The existing models do not incorporate formal
procedural mechanisms either for collective employee action or for
collective information exchange between employers and relevant groups of
employees within the workplace. The models instead rely upon individual
employees to initiate and participate in the process. For these models to
work, individual employees must be aware of and understand their
procedural rights, be aware of and understand the legal remedies available
to protect them when exercising their procedural rights, and perceive those
legal remedies as sufficient to overcome concerns about employer
retaliation.
154
Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 56–57. Currently, the FMLA only requires that the
mandated unpaid leave periods be provided on an intermittent or reduced leave basis in very narrow
circumstances. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(b).
155
Many scholars have criticized the FMLA for its limited coverage on a variety of different
grounds. See, e.g., Deborah J. Anthony, The Hidden Harms of the Family and Medical Leave Act:
Gender-Neutral Versus Gender-Equal, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 459, 468–81 (2008)
(explaining how the FMLA’s requirements have gender, class, and race effects); Naomi Gerstel & Amy
Armenia, Giving and Taking Family Leaves: Right or Privilege?, 21 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 161, 166–
76 (2009) (demonstrating how the FMLA reinforces a family model primarily practiced by white,
wealthy, heterosexual couples, and exacerbates inequalities based on marital status, sexuality, race, and
class); Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women’s Cultural
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371,
419–26 (2001) (describing how the FMLA’s coverage requirements, which are “premised upon the
existence of the heterosexual, two-parent family,” end up excluding all but “the most privileged
workers”); Ann O’Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 38–47 (2007) (explaining how the FMLA effectively excludes low-income workers
from protection).
156
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 57 n.142, 85–86; see also Travis, Lashing Back, supra
note 124, at 355–66 (explaining how individual procedural rights for some employees can stamp a
“procedural footprint in the workplace,” which ends up benefiting other employees as well).
157
Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 27.
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Under the right circumstances, it is possible that individual process
rights might indirectly facilitate collective employee action or collective
information exchange within a workplace. Nothing in the existing models
would prevent individual employees from sharing information about the
employer that they receive through individual participation in the
process.158 Nor would the existing models prevent employers from
aggregating information that they receive from individual employees. In
addition, while Professor Arnow-Richman acknowledges that individual
procedural rights are “hardly a substitute for traditional bargaining,” she
also describes how such rights might at least create “a framework for
collective action.”159 The process of learning about a new individual right,
and of naming and claiming such a right, can itself be a social endeavor
that connects individual employees within a workplace in meaningful
ways.160 Arnow-Richman suggests that this process might help
employees—as a group—begin questioning and delegitimizing unilateral
employer acts, which eventually may encourage more explicitly concerted
employee action.161
Some of the existing models of individual reflexive rights contain
modest elements that might facilitate these potential collective effects. The
U.K. Employment Act, for example, permits an individual employee to
bring a trusted colleague to all of the meetings that the individual has with
the employer to discuss the employee’s request for an alternative work
schedule.162 The Act also requires that an individual employee’s initial
proposal for an alternative work schedule contain certain information,
which sometimes requires the employee to consult with co-workers.163
Specifically, an employee’s initial written application must not only
identify the employee’s desired work schedule, but also must address how
to mitigate any anticipated affects that the proposed schedule might have
on the employer’s operations.164 If the proposed work schedule would
affect co-workers, the Act contemplates that the individual employee might
need to obtain feedback from those co-workers to address the operational
impact component in the employee’s request.165 While this requirement
158
In the context of the ADA’s interactive process, several authors have explained how
employees can benefit by sharing information that they receive from engaging in the process. See, e.g.,
RUTH O’BRIEN, BODIES IN REVOLT: GENDER, DISABILITY, AND A WORKPLACE ETHIC OF CARE 113
(2005); Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 858 (2008); Travis,
Lashing Back, supra note 124, at 366.
159
Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 70.
160
See id.
161
See id.
162
Employment Rights Act, 1996, c. 18, § 80G(2)(k) (U.K.) (as amended by the Employment
Act, 2002, c. 22, § 47 (U.K.)); The Flexible Working (Procedural Requirements) Regulations, 2002,
S.I. 2002/3207, art. 14 (U.K.).
163
See Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 76–77.
164
See id.
165
See id. at 77.
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thus might encourage discussions among employees, such detailed and
challenging requirements for an employee to even initiate the process
simultaneously highlight the risk that not all employees will be able to
access individual-based process rights.166
Despite some of the positive research results regarding individual
employees’ use of the U.K. Employment Act, more general research in the
United Kingdom legitimates this concern by questioning the ability of
individual reflexive laws to advance women’s workplace equality. Based
on empirical studies of the British experience, several researchers recently
have concluded that reflexive regulation is unlikely to achieve gender
equality goals unless unions or other employee organizations jointly
manage the process that the reflexive law creates.167 These researchers
have concluded that one of the preconditions for individual reflexive laws
to be effective is the existence of “bridging institutions,” which they
describe as extra-legal structures for employee representation and
workplace deliberation.168 These researchers emphasize the importance of
having these deliberative mechanisms at the workplace level.169 Because
such institutional prerequisites currently do not exist in most workplaces in
either the United Kingdom or the United States, these researchers remain
skeptical about the potential ability of individual reflexive law strategies to
advance workplace equality.170
Professors Vicki Schultz and Allison Hoffman have reached a similar
conclusion in their thoughtful work advocating for a reduced-hour work
week.171 Schultz and Hoffman have identified a variety of legislative
incentives, negotiated solutions, and private industry initiatives that might
be used to help achieve that goal.172 Similar to the British researchers,
Schultz and Hoffman have concluded that anything other than private
industry initiatives would require the development of “a stronger structure
to bolster representation of employees’ interests for purpose of designing
and enforcing corporate compliance.”173
This research highlights the need for work/family advocates to
166
While setting a high standard for employees to initiate a workplace process is likely to
constrict the availability of the right, it may also have some benefits, including that it effectively
screens out “facially unreasonable requests,” and that “it sets the stage for constructive discussion
between the parties” by “treat[ing] the employee as having a stake in and responsibility for the business
as a whole.” Id.
167
See Deakin & McLaughlin, supra note 101, at 323.
168
See id. at 320–21, 324, 326.
169
See id. at 320, 324–25 (describing one form of reflexive law as imposing a default rule that
allows the parties to negotiate variances to the statutory norm, and describing the opt-out as a failed
version of this form because of the lack of “collective routes” for negotiation and “the ease with which
employers could impose opt-outs on individual workers”).
170
See id. at 323–26.
171
See Schultz & Hoffman, supra note 66, at 144–49.
172
See id.
173
Id. at 147.
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consider not just individual procedural rights, but to consider “collective
reflexive” forms of regulation as well. Collective reflexive laws would
vest new procedural rights and establish mechanisms for information
exchange at a group-based level, rather than relying exclusively on the
creation and exercise of individual employee rights. One barrier to such an
approach is what Professor Arnow-Richman refers to as “the absence of
obvious substantive tie-ins,”174 to which a procedural right could most
easily be attached. In the context of women’s employment equality and
workplace flexibility, existing substantive rights are limited to the
antidiscrimination mandate in the Pregnancy Discrimination Act and the
narrow leave entitlements in the FMLA—both of which are framed in
terms of individual employee rights.
While the political viability of enacting new free-standing reflexive
laws may indeed be questionable, there may be other routes for such
experimentation beyond just attempting to add a new procedural obligation
to an existing substantive right. In the context of the four-day work week,
two examples exist in which a substantive entitlement instead was used as
a bargaining chip to facilitate the creation and design of new collective
reflexive rights. Those examples are California’s Workplace Flexibility
Act and the Federal Alternative Work Schedules Act, which are described
below.
A. The California Workplace Flexibility Act
The first example of collective reflexive regulation comes from
California, which is one of only a few states that provide most non-exempt
employees with the substantive right to receive daily overtime premium
pay.175 Under federal law, as well as most state laws, overtime premium

174

Arnow-Richman, supra note 100, at 85–86.
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510 (West 2003) (establishing the basic daily overtime rules). Various
California wage orders exempt certain employees from the daily overtime obligations. See, e.g., CAL.
DIV. OF LABOR STANDARDS ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT POLICIES AND INTERPRETATIONS
MANUAL § 56.2.1.1 (2007), available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/DLSEManual/dlse_enfcmanual.pdf
[hereinafter INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL] (noting that agricultural workers are allowed to work up to
ten hours per day without an employer incurring overtime premium obligations). Other states and
territories that impose daily overtime obligations include: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. § 23.10.060 (2008)
(requiring overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day); Colorado, Colorado Minimum
Wage Order No. 25, 7 COLO. CODE REGS. § 1103-1 (2009) (requiring overtime premiums for hours
over twelve in a single day); Florida, FLA. STAT. § 448.01 (West 2002) (requiring overtime premiums
for hours over ten in a single day); Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 608.018 (2006) (requiring
overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day, except by mutual agreement in certain
situations); Puerto Rico, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 274 (2001) (requiring overtime premiums for hours
over eight in a single day); and the Virgin Islands, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 20 (1997) (requiring
overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day under certain circumstances). Some other states
impose daily overtime requirements for employees in certain industries, occupations, or work sectors.
E.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 652.020 (2007) (requiring daily overtime premiums in certain circumstances for
certain employees at mills, logging camps, and manufacturing enterprises); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-5175
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rates are triggered only when an employee’s hours exceed forty in a single
work week.176 In California, employers additionally are required to pay
most of their non-exempt workers at a premium rate for all hours over
eight in a single work day: at a rate of one and one-half times the regular
rate of pay for hours over eight, and twice the regular rate of pay for hours
over twelve.177 These daily overtime obligations create a financial
disincentive for California employers to use compressed work weeks. A
California employer using a 4/10 schedule, for example, would incur
overtime premium liability for eight hours each week that it would avoid
by spreading the forty hours over a standard five-day, eight-hour-per-day
schedule.
To the extent that employers are otherwise motivated to experiment
with four-day work weeks, daily overtime obligations effectively bring
employees to the bargaining table with extra leverage. In California’s
political process, this leverage resulted in the enactment of the Eight-HourDay Restoration and Workplace Flexibility Act of 1999 (the “Workplace
Flexibility Act”).178 The Workplace Flexibility Act essentially codified
employees’ willingness to give up their daily overtime premiums only in
exchange for obtaining some control over the adoption and design of a
compressed work schedule. The Workplace Flexibility Act is primarily a
reflexive law, and it is unique in establishing collective employee control
within private, non-organized workforce settings.
Like other reflexive laws, the Workplace Flexibility Act largely
establishes procedures, rather than substantive rights. If an employer
follows the established procedures, the employer may adopt a compressed
work schedule that qualifies the employer for an exemption from some or

101 (2009) (requiring overtime premiums for hours over eight in a single day for state and county
employees).
176
See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 778.102 (2009); see
also supra note 175 (listing the small group of states that impose daily overtime premiums).
177
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a).
178
1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 134 (A.B. 60) (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 500–58
(West 2003)). Former California Governor Gray Davis signed the law on July 20, 1999, and it became
effective on January 1, 2000. See Bette E. Robin, The Impact of the New Alternative Work Schedule on
Dental Offices, 29 J. CAL. DENTAL ASS’N 289, 289 (2001). The Act was in response to the California
Industrial Welfare Commission’s (“IWC”) elimination of daily overtime obligations in 1998, which
was itself a response to former California Governor Pete Wilson’s efforts to eliminate the state’s daily
overtime obligations. See Tyler M. Paetkau, Time Off in California: State and Federal Laws on
Employee Leave, Vacations and Holidays, LAWMEMO, http://www.lawmemo.com/articles/timeoff.htm
(last visited Apr. 11, 2010); Cal. Exec. Order Nos. W-75-94 (1994), W-84-94 (1994), W-142-97 (1997)
(issued by Governor Pete Wilson to suspend daily overtime for certain workers); Letter from Pete
Wilson, Governor of California, to Members of the Industrial Welfare Commission (Sept. 8, 1995),
available at http://www.dir.ca.gov/Bulletin /Oct_Nov_95/IWC_Letter.html (requesting the repeal of
daily overtime obligations). The Workplace Flexibility Act authorized the IWC to issue implementing
regulations, which the IWC has done in the form of various Wage Orders. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 517
(West 2003); see also Robin, supra, at 289–93 (describing the regulatory process).

1256

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42:1223

all of the otherwise mandatory daily overtime obligations.179 The
procedures apply not just to four-day work week schedules, but to “any
regularly scheduled workweek requiring an employee to work more than
eight hours in a 24-hour period.”180 Because the procedures focus
primarily on groups of employees in “readily identifiable work unit[s],”
and only secondarily on employees as individuals, the Workplace
Flexibility Act indirectly provides affected employees with a collective
voice over the adoption and design of compressed work schedules.181
Under this collective reflexive approach, an employer must first submit
a written proposal for a compressed work week to all employees in an
affected work unit.182 The proposal must specify the number of days in the
work week and the number of hours in each work shift that would be
required under the proposed compressed schedule.183 The proposal may
include either a single compressed work week option or a menu of
compressed work schedules from which employees within a work unit
would be permitted to choose.184
The employer must then hold a secret ballot election for all employees
within the work unit that would be affected by the proposed schedule.185
The employer must hold the election during regular working hours at the
employees’ work site.186 At least two-thirds of the employees in the
affected work unit must vote in favor of the compressed work week for the
schedule to become certified for a daily overtime exemption.187 At least
fourteen days before the election, the employer must hold a meeting in
which the employer provides to the employees in the affected work unit a
written disclosure of how the proposed schedule would affect hours,

179
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a)(1); see also CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a) (West Supp. 2010)
(describing the procedures that an employer must follow to qualify a compressed work schedule for the
daily overtime exemption authorized in CAL. LAB. CODE § 510(a)(1)).
180
See INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.24.
181
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); see also id. § 511(i) (defining a “work unit” to include “a
division, a department, a job classification, a shift, a separate physical location, or a recognized
subdivision thereof”); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8.2 (describing the criteria for
identifying a “work unit”). The collective focus of the Workplace Flexibility Act may have been
undermined by recent amendments in May 2009. See Paul R. Lynd, California Adds Modest Flexibility
to Alternative Workweek Schedules, EMP. L. ALERT (Nixon Peabody LLP), May 15, 2009, at 1–2,
available at http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/Employment_Law_Alert_05_
15_09.pdf. Those amendments clarified that a “work unit” may contain a single employee, as long as
the single employee meets the general criteria for a work unit. See 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. 2d Ex. Sess.
Ch. 3 (A.B.5) (West) (codified at CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(i)).
182
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a) (requiring a “proposal” by the employer); INTERPRETATIONS
MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.7.1 (requiring that the proposal be in writing).
183
INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 56.7.1–.2.
184
CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.7.2.1.
185
CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8.
186
INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8.
187
CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.8.1.
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188

wages, and benefits.
The employer must provide this written disclosure
in multiple languages if more than five percent of the employees in the
work unit primarily speak a language other than English.189 The employer
must mail the written disclosure to any employees who do not attend the
meeting.190
The implementing regulations for the Workplace Flexibility Act
include a variety of safeguards to help ensure that the results of an
alternative work week election reflect the true desires of the employees in
the work unit. Although employers are free to express opinions regarding
a compressed work schedule, employers are prohibited from intimidating
or coercing employees to vote in a particular way.191 Employers may not
engage in indirect coercion by ensuring that employees are absent from the
election because adopting a proposed schedule requires not just two-thirds
of the employees who actually vote, but two-thirds of all affected
employees in a work unit.192 In addition to requiring a secret ballot to
reduce the risk of individual retaliation, the law also prohibits an employer
from reducing any employee’s regular rate of pay as the result of the
overall election results.193
If an employer follows these procedures and obtains the requisite twothirds affirmative vote by the employees in an affected work unit, the
employer may adopt the proposed compressed work week without
incurring all of the standard daily overtime obligations.194 Nothing in the
Workplace Flexibility Act prohibits employers from unilaterally imposing
a four-day work week or other form of compressed schedule without
following any of these procedures—nor does it prohibit individual
employees from unilaterally requesting such schedules—as long as the
employer complies with standard daily overtime obligations. The Act
merely provides the incentive of avoiding standard daily overtime liability
in exchange for following procedures that provide groups of employees
with a voice in the process. To obtain this benefit, the employer must
report the results of the secret ballot election to a designated state agency
within thirty days after the results are final, at which point the compressed
work schedule becomes a qualified plan.195 For most occupational
categories, a qualified compressed schedule exempts the employer from
any daily overtime obligations for up to ten hours per day on scheduled
188

INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.10. If the employer fails to comply with
any of the disclosure procedures, the election will be invalid and will not entitle the employer to the
overtime premium exemptions for its proposed compressed work schedule. See id. § 56.10.1.
189
Id. § 56.10.
190
Id.
191
See id. §§ 56.13, 56.13.2.
192
See id. § 56.8.3.
193
See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 511(a), (c); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.11.
194
See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 510(a)(1), 511(a).
195
See id. § 511(e).
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196

work days.
Employers would still be obligated to pay one and one-half
the regular rate of pay for hours over ten and twice the regular rate of pay
for hours over twelve on a scheduled work day, but an employer could use
a 4/10 work week without incurring any overtime liability.197
Once a compressed work week is certified under this procedure,
employees also retain a collective right to repeal it. If one-third of the
affected employees in a work unit present a signed petition to the
employer, the employer must hold another secret ballot election within
thirty days to determine whether the work unit wants to repeal the
compressed schedule.198 The same procedures that apply to the original
election also apply to a repeal election, which requires an affirmative vote
of at least two-thirds of the employees in the affected work unit for the
repeal to succeed.199 An employer must comply with the repeal of a
compressed work week within sixty days after the election is final, unless
the employer can demonstrate to the governing state agency that doing so
would impose an “undue hardship.”200 Elections either to adopt or to
repeal a compressed schedule may not be held more frequently than once
per year.201
In addition to the collective procedural rights that are the primary focus
of the Workplace Flexibility Act, the Act also contains a secondary level of
individual accommodation rights for employees who were eligible to vote
in a successful election but who are unable to work the compressed
schedule due to caregiving or other obligations.202 The employer must
make a “reasonable effort” to accommodate such employees by providing
a work schedule that does not include more than eight hours per day.203
This limited opt-out right provides some flexibility for employees whose
work/family circumstances fit better within a more traditional work week
schedule.
In addition to addressing the critical component of employee choice
and control, California’s Workplace Flexibility Act and its supporting
regulatory wage orders also incorporate requirements that are responsive to
196

See id. § 511(a)–(b).
See id.; see also Mitchell v. Yoplait, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 267, 269–71 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
2004) (upholding the validity of an alternative work week schedule that used three twelve-hour shifts
and one six-hour shift, which only obligated the employer to pay time and one-half for the hours over
ten in each of the twelve-hour days). The overtime obligations are slightly different for some
categories of workers, such as those in the healthcare industry. See INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra
note 175, § 56.3.2 (explaining that employees in the healthcare industry may agree to compressed work
weeks that exempt an employer from any overtime obligations for up to twelve-hour days under certain
circumstances).
198
INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 56.17, 56.17.1, 56.17.2.
199
See id. §§ 56.17.2, 56.17.3.
200
Id. § 56.17.6.
201
Id. § 56.17.4.
202
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(d); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.19.
203
CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(d); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.19.
197
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a variety of work/family issues that might arise from a four-day work week
or other compressed schedule. For example, employers may not
implement the compressed schedule after a valid election for at least thirty
days,204 which gives employees time to modify their childcare
arrangements before the change takes place. For most occupational
categories, the compressed schedule will not be certified unless it provides
for at least four hours of work on any scheduled work day,205 which can
reduce childcare challenges that may arise with very short-hour needs on
particular days and very long-hour needs on others. Most occupational
categories also require the compressed schedule to contain at least two
consecutive days off,206 which ensures that significant blocks of time will
exist each week that may be dedicated to family-related activities. The law
also permits employers to allow employees to request a substitution of one
regularly-scheduled work day for another similar-length work day to
accommodate employees’ personal needs without losing the employer’s
That provision can provide flexibility for
overtime exemption.207
employees who need occasional schedule changes for unpredictable
caregiving needs, such as a sick parent or child. Although the Workplace
Flexibility Act eliminates a significant component of the standard daily
overtime obligations, it does not eliminate overtime premiums altogether,
thereby retaining a disincentive for employers to design compressed
schedules that include days over ten hours long, which can be particularly
difficult from a childcare and family balance perspective.208
The Workplace Flexibility Act also creates incentives for schedule
predictability once the compressed schedule is in place, which often is
crucial for employees who are trying to manage both work and family
obligations. Although an employer’s original proposal need only identify
the number of days and hours per day that the compressed schedule will
entail, the employer must assign each employee a “regularly-scheduled”
shift with advance notice of the start and end times of each scheduled work
day before the compressed schedule takes effect.209 The employer must
give an employee at least one week’s notice before changing any
204

INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.17.8.
See id. § 56.3.3.
206
See id. § 56.4.
207
See id. § 56.23.9.
208
See CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(a)–(b) (retaining the obligation to pay one and one-half the regular
rate for hours over ten on a regularly-scheduled day and twice the regular rate for hours over twelve on
a regularly-scheduled day).
209
See INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.23; see also id. § 56.7.2 (specifying the
required information in an alternative work week proposal and requiring the proposed schedule to have
a specified number of “regularly recurring work days”); id. § 56.7.2.7 (noting that the statute “does not
allow a situation where the employee may opt to work an alternative workweek or a normal workweek
on an irregular basis for that would not meet the criteria of ‘regularly scheduled’”). The regulations do
permit a compressed schedule to differ from week to week, “so long as the schedule is regular and
recurring,” for example, by having two different schedules that regularly alter weeks. See id. § 56.7.3.
205
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scheduled days or hours, and if schedule changes are more than
“‘occasional’ occurrences,” the employer will lose its daily overtime
exemption.210 Additionally, the Act imposes overtime liability when an
employer requires an employee to work hours or days outside of the
employee’s regular schedule. For an employee working longer than eight
hours in a day, the employer must pay one and one-half times the regular
rate of pay for hours beyond those regularly scheduled that day, and twice
the regular rate of pay for any such hours over twelve.211 The employer
also must pay twice the regular rate of pay for any hours beyond eight on a
non-regularly-scheduled day.212 Overall, these rules create incentives for
an employer not to deviate from the established four-day work week or
other qualified compressed work schedule.
Not surprisingly, many employers’ representatives and business groups
have criticized the Workplace Flexibility Act as antithetical to flexibility,
and they have regularly lobbied for legislation that would make it easier for
employers to avoid daily overtime obligations.213 These lobbying efforts
recently have begun to incorporate work/family rhetoric by attempting to
link employers’ desire to expand their ability to adopt four-day work
weeks without incurring daily overtime premiums with an interest in
“accommodat[ing] diverse family obligations.”214 The legislation proposed
by these business groups, however, is striking in its general abandonment
of the existing legal safeguards that recognize the importance of employee
control, scheduling predictability, and other criteria for maximizing the
work/family benefits of compressed work schedules.
Despite reasons to be wary of the business community’s eleventh-hour
interest in work/family balance as a motive for seeking to reduce daily
overtime obligations, business representatives may be accurate in
210

See id. §§ 56.23.1, 56.23.2.
CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(b); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, § 56.23.3.
212
CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(b); INTERPRETATIONS MANUAL, supra note 175, §§ 56.23.3, 56.23.8.
213
See, e.g., CalChamber Urges Support for Flexible Work Schedules, CALCHAMBER, Mar. 17,
2008, http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/03172008ts.aspx (quoting a policy advocate for the
California Chamber of Commerce who argued that the Workplace Flexibility Act “effectively
eliminates most employers and employees from choosing alternative options,” because “[a]ny deviation
from the rigidly controlled process voids the election and subjects the employer to potential lawsuits
that can seek up to three years of back overtime pay for affected workers”); Paetkau, supra note 178
(describing the Workplace Flexibility Act’s procedures as “restrictive, cumbersome and costly”);
Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles Labor & Employment Alert: The New Millennium Means the Return of
Daily Overtime, FINDLAW, 1999, available at http://library.findlaw.com/1999/Jul/1/131002.
html (predicting that “few employers will utilize the alternative workweek schedules” authorized by the
Workplace Flexibility Act because they “provide very little scheduling flexibility, and impose
significant procedural burdens on employers”); Legislation Loosens Up Alternative Work Week
Schedule Rules, SMALL BUSINESS CAL., Apr. 10, 2009, http://www.smallbusinesscalifornia.org/
Alternative%20Work%20Week%20Schedule.htm (describing the election process as “convoluted”).
214
See Employer, Employee Testimony Illustrates Need for Flexible Work Schedules,
CALCHAMBER, Apr. 10, 2008, http://www.calchamber.com/headlines/pages/04102008ts.aspx; see also
CalChamber Urges Support, supra note 213.
211
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describing the existing procedural requirements as too cumbersome to ever
be widely used. Although employers are required to report all election
results to a designated state agency, the agency’s recordkeeping methods
make it difficult to determine accurately how many California employers
currently are operating under a certified compressed work schedule. The
California Division of Labor Statistics and Research maintains a
searchable online database of all California employers that have filed
alternative work week election results.215 This database includes an entry
for every report that the agency has received since the Workplace
Flexibility Act became effective on January 1, 2000—totaling over 18,500
entries.216 For several reasons, that total likely exceeds the number of
California employers that currently are operating under a certified
compressed work plan. First, the entries include reports of unsuccessful
elections to adopt a compressed schedule, as well as reports of successful
elections to repeal previously adopted plans. Second, there are many
instances of multiple entries for single employers, many of which file
separate reports for multiple elections in different work units within their
organization. Finally, there is no way to easily determine whether the
employers listed in the database are still using their certified alternative
work schedules, whether the affected work units still exist, or whether the
employers are even still in business. Nevertheless, the over 18,500 entries
at least provide an upper limit to the estimated number of employers that
have used the election procedures to adopt an eligible compressed work
plan.217
While business interest groups might use this data to support their
critique of California’s Workplace Flexibility Act as going too far, some
work/family advocates may criticize the law from the opposite direction,
by questioning whether the law’s procedural mechanisms do enough to
enable the expression of a collective employee voice. While the Act
removes the initial burden that individual reflexive laws place on
individual employees to initiate the process, it does so by giving
employers—not groups of employees—the ability to control the
215
See Alternative Workweek Elections Database, http://www.dir.ca.gov/databases/dlsr/DLSRAWE.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
216
See id. (click “dlsr-awe.zip”). California Labor Code section 511(e) requires that employers
report the results of all such elections to the Division of Labor Statistics and Research within thirty
days after the results are final. CAL. LAB. CODE § 511(e). The IWC’s implementing wage orders
require that the reports of election results be made public. See, e.g., Industrial Welfare Commission
Order 4-2001 Regulating Wages, Hours, and Working Conditions in the Professional, Technical,
Clerical, Mechanical and Similar Occupations, ¶3(C)(6) (effective Jan. 1, 2001 as amended), available
at http://www.dir.ca.gov/IWC/IWCArticle4.pdf.
217
This observation is consistent with one published estimate on March 31, 2006, that “[a]bout
11,000 of the state’s 800,000-plus employers” were then operating under a certified alternative work
week plan. See Posting of Cal Labor Law to California Labor & Employment Law Blog,
http://www.callaborlaw.com/archives/new-laws-legislation-two-bills-introduced-to-increase-workweek
-flexibility.html (Mar. 31, 2006).
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parameters of the discussion. The Act empowers employers to select the
specific alternative work schedules to include in a proposal to an affected
work unit, rather than vice versa. While the Act grants employees
collective control over the results of an employer’s proposal, employees’
collective voice in designing workplace schedules is largely constrained to
merely affirming or rejecting what an employer puts on the table. Such an
approach certainly can help the parties identify some alternative work
schedules that will be mutually beneficial, and it allows employers to
obtain valuable aggregate data about employees’ desires and working time
constraints. Nevertheless, this particular collective reflexive approach falls
short of envisioning and situating employees as creative collaborators in
the process.
B. The Federal Alternative Work Schedules Act
The Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules
Act, which is also known as the Alternative Work Schedules Act
(“AWSA”),218 provides the second example of a collective reflexive form
of regulation in the context of the four-day work week. Like California’s
Workplace Flexibility Act, the AWSA’s existence is linked to the
existence of daily overtime obligations. As in California, most non-exempt
federal employees are entitled to daily overtime premiums for all hours
over eight in a single work day.219 When the federal government became
interested in encouraging compressed work weeks as a traffic congestion
measure and as a response to the oil crisis of the 1970s, legislators were
able to use the carrot of reduced payroll expenses for daily overtime as an
incentive to encourage federal agencies to experiment with a four-day
work week.220
Similar to California law, the AWSA establishes a procedure by which
a federal agency may adopt a compressed work week that is exempt from
most of the standard daily overtime requirements.221 In a non-organized
work unit of a federal agency, this procedure requires an affirmative vote
of a majority of the employees in an affected work unit.222 Unlike
218

Federal Employees Flexible and Compressed Work Schedules Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 6120–6133
(2006); see Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 305 (noting the common name).
219
5 U.S.C. § 5542(a)(1) (2006).
220
See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307–10 (describing the history of the AWSA).
221
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 6127–6128. The AWSA regulates both the use of compressed work weeks
and the use of flexible schedules that allow employees to vary their daily arrival and departure times
within certain parameters. See id. §§ 6122–6126. This Article limits its focus to the rules governing
compressed work weeks.
222
See id. § 6127(b)(1). A work unit is defined for purposes of the AWSA as “an entity located in
one place with a specific mission, with homogeneous procedures or technology, and headed by a
supervisor or manager authorized to approve time and attendance reports and approve leave.” U.S.
OFFICE PERS. MGMT., HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES § 2 (1996) [hereinafter
HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES].
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California law, the AWSA and its supporting agency documents do not
specify any details regarding the voting process, which gives agencies
much greater flexibility in conducting elections.223 Similar to California
law, the AWSA includes a secondary individual accommodation right
when the compressed work schedule would “impose a personal hardship”
on an employee due to caregiving responsibilities or for any other
reason.224 Employers that adopt compressed work schedules under the
AWSA are required to establish a procedure for employees to submit their
personal hardship requests.225 As a public employer, a federal agency
always retains the right to end a compressed work schedule if the agency
finds an adverse impact on productivity, provision of services, or cost of
operations, unlike under California law, which vests a repeal right in the
hands of affected employees in private workplace settings.226 The AWSA
does incorporate some of the provisions found in California law that
address work/family balance issues, such as encouraging schedule
predictability by retaining standard overtime premiums whenever an
employee is required to work hours beyond those regularly scheduled
under the compressed work plan.227
The streamlined procedures for adopting a compressed work week
under the AWSA may have contributed to their more widespread use
within federal agencies than within the private sector that is governed by
the more complicated procedures under California law. Nevertheless,
many federal agencies still may not have experimented with the full extent
of flexible workplace options permitted and encouraged by the AWSA.228
223
See 5 U.S.C. § 6127(b)(1); see also HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES, supra
note 222, § 7(b) (stating that “[i]n an unorganized unit, a majority of affected employees must vote to
be included in a [compressed work schedule] program”); id. § 13(o)(1) (explaining that “a compressed
work schedule may not be established in an unorganized unit unless a majority of employees in the
organization who would be included vote to be included,” which requires that “the number of
affirmative votes exceeds fifty percent of the number of employees and supervisors in the organization
proposed for inclusion in a compressed work schedule”).
224
See 5 U.S.C. § 6127(b)(2). The employee is required to make a written request to the agency.
Id. If the agency determines that the employee’s participation in the compressed schedule would
impose a personal hardship, the agency must either except the employee from the compressed schedule
or reassign the employee to the first available position within the agency that is not part of the
compressed work week plan and for which the employee is qualified. Id. See also HANDBOOK ON
ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES, supra note 222, § 13(p)(2) (explaining how agencies should
determine whether a personal hardship exists and identifying caregiving responsibilities for “disabled
family members or dependent children” as potential grounds for a hardship finding).
225
See HANDBOOK ON ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES, supra note 222, § 13(p)(1).
226
See 5 U.S.C. § 6131(a).
227
See id. § 6128(b).
228
See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
ALTERNATIVE WORK SCHEDULES: MANY AGENCIES DO NOT ALLOW EMPLOYEES THE FULL
FLEXIBILITY PERMITTED BY LAW 4, 14 (1994), available at http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/
ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/13/4f/c7.pdf (concluding from a review of fifty-nine
federal agencies that although “large numbers of employees” are using either flexible or compressed
schedules, “many employees are not allowed to use [alternative work schedules], and few organizations
allow their employees to use the options offering the greatest flexibility”).
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In 1994, the United States General Accounting Office surveyed fifty-nine
federal agencies and found that fifty-seven of them offered some form of
flexible work scheduling authorized by the AWSA for at least some of
their employees.229 This survey, however, also found that many employees
who desired greater scheduling flexibility were not permitted to use
various options that are authorized by the AWSA and that few agencies
used the permissible scheduling options that provided employees with the
greatest control over their working hours.230 Despite finding that “large
numbers of employees in many organizations” were using flexible options
authorized by the AWSA, the report recommended moving beyond the
Act’s existing reflexive approach that merely creates incentives for
experimenting with workplace flexibility, by requesting a Presidential
Executive Order requiring all federal agencies to adopt alternative work
schedule programs.231
While it would be helpful to obtain more recent data to fully assess the
AWSA’s effects, this report’s conclusion highlights the obvious point that,
like all work/family policy initiatives, the collective reflexive approaches
in California’s Workplace Flexibility Act and the federal AWSA will never
be the singular solution to work/family conflict. Both of these examples
themselves incorporate multiple regulatory approaches, as both supplement
their primary grants of collective process rights with secondary opt-out
entitlements in the form of individual accommodation rights. In doing so,
these laws not only illustrate one particular incarnation of a collective
reflexive approach, but also illustrate how this under-developed approach
might work as a component of broader work/family regulatory reforms.
Collective reflexive approaches possess the same potential strengths of
reflexive regulation more generally: they facilitate information exchange in
a non-adversarial forum that encourages jointly-designed and tailored
solutions to the structuring of working time within a particular workplace.
At the same time, collective reflexive approaches attempt to address the
risk of under-utilization in models that depend exclusively on the ability
and willingness of individual employees to initiate and participate in a
workplace procedure. In addition, these collective reflexive approaches
may facilitate a broader exchange of relevant information within a
workplace, which could further advance the goal of achieving scheduling
innovation that is beneficial to employers and employees alike.
Of course, the existence of both the California Workplace Flexibility
Act and the federal AWSA depended, somewhat paradoxically, upon the
existence of a legal disincentive to workplace flexibility—i.e., upon the
existence of daily overtime premium obligations. While this fact may limit
229
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the potential for experimenting with similar approaches elsewhere, it also
highlights the importance of work/family proposals that focus on revising
wage and hours laws as a necessary first step toward more fundamental
working time innovation.232 In addition, both the California Workplace
Flexibility Act and the federal AWSA assume, to a large degree, a preexisting norm of a forty-hour work week. Thus, like all four-day work
week initiatives, they share a limited ability to reach the often acute
work/family conflicts experienced by the growing population of workers
laboring at both ends of the time divide. Nevertheless, they provide
interesting models of an under-developed strand of reflexive regulation
that is worth considering, not just in capitalizing on the unique opportunity
to influence the current four-day work week debate, but also when
considering future regulation of workplace flexibility more generally.
IV. CONCLUSION
According to the headline of a Time article in September 2009, “The
Four-Day Workweek Is Winning Fans.”233 On the heels of Utah’s
adoption of a four-day work week for approximately 17,000 of its public
employees, such headlines have become commonplace, as both the
economic crisis and environmental concerns have converged to bring
compressed work weeks to center stage.234 Although work/family
concerns have not played a driving role in this recent intense interest in the
four-day work week, advocates increasingly have begun to invoke
work/family benefits as a way to win additional fans. Utah’s experience is
illustrative. While former Utah Governor Jon Huntsman made it clear that
reducing energy expenses was the motivation for his Executive Order
moving most of his state’s employees to a four-day work week,235 Utah’s
Executive Director for Human Resources, Jeff Herring, was quick to
232
See, e.g., JACOBS & GERSON, supra note 5, at 183–87 (proposing to eliminate the white-collar
exemptions from the FLSA to bring a larger proportion of the workforce within the law’s overtime
premium rules, and to move the standard work week from forty to thirty-five hours per week); Schultz
& Hoffman, supra note 66, at 140–41 (same).
233
Bryan Walsh, The Four-Day Workweek Is Winning Fans, TIME, Sept. 7, 2009,
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1919162,00.html.
234
See, e.g., Brock Vergakis, 4-Day Week Seems To Work Well for Utah, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 1,
2009, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2009/03/01/4_day_week_seems_to_work_well_for_
utah/; Utah Is Going to a 4-Day Workweek: In an Effort To Save Energy, State Employees Will Get
Friday Off, MSNBC, July 3, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25518225/; Utah’s 4-Day Workweek
Brings Some Dividends, CONNECT2UTAH, Oct. 22, 2009, http://connect2utah.com/content/news/story/?
cid=58071.
235
See Utah Exec. Order No. 2008/0006 (July 31, 2008), reprinted in 16 Utah Bull. 1 (Aug. 15,
2008), available at http://www.rules.utah.gov/publicat/bull_pdf/2008/b20080815.pdf; see also
Vergakis, supra note 234 (noting that Utah switched most of its state employees to a four-day work
week “primarily to save money on electricity, gasoline, and other energy expenses”); Utah Is Going to
a 4-Day Workweek, supra note 234 (describing the estimated energy savings that a four-day work week
would produce); Utah’s 4-Day Workweek Brings Some Dividends, supra note 234 (noting “Former
Gov. Jon Huntsman made the switch for Utah in August 2008, largely to cut energy costs”).
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promote the plan to the media as a way to “‘really make a difference for
work-life balance.’”236 The federal AWSA similarly began as a traffic
control and energy conservation measure, but decades later gave President
Clinton something to point to when addressing the growing concerns of
employees who are balancing work and family demands.237
The recent spotlight on the four-day work week provides work/family
advocates with a unique opportunity to enter the public debate and raise
awareness about the real potential—and real limitations—of this particular
form of working time innovation. This includes the opportunity to educate
policy makers, the public, and the press about the heterogeneous sources of
work/family conflict and the very different needs of workers who are
laboring at different occupational statuses, different income levels, and
different points along the time divide. While the empirical research indeed
supports the claim that a compressed work schedule can enhance
work/family balance for some workers, the four-day work week is unlikely
to become available for many workers whose often acute work/family
conflicts result from very long-hour positions, or from very unpredictable
and insecure short-hour jobs. While the four-day work week may provide
real benefits to some groups of workers, including those working asocial
and often variable shift-work, work/family advocates need to challenge
undifferentiated assertions of work/family benefits from a compressed
work week design.
While these observations might lead work/family advocates to shift
their priorities elsewhere, the current attention being paid to the four-day
work week offers the further opportunity to consider how legal regulation
might be used most effectively to advance workplace flexibility for a
broader group of workers. To that end, the unique regulations in
California’s Workplace Flexibility Act and the federal AWSA illustrate an
under-developed “collective reflexive” approach that may add a new
dimension to future workplace flexibility reform efforts. To the extent that
the four-day work week helps facilitate these types of continued legal and
policy discussions about how to restructure the workplace around the norm
of a worker with caregiving responsibilities, I have become a fan as well.
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See Walsh, supra note 233.
See Liechty & Anderson, supra note 1, at 307–14 (chronicling the legislative history of the
AWSA).
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